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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellee, Washington Terrace City (hereinafter "City"), 
agrees with the jurisdictional statement of Appellant, Michael D. 
Darby. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The City accepts the issues presented by Darby on page 2 
of his brief with the exception of Issue ffdn because Darby did not 
raise this issue before the trial court and, accordingly, cannot 
raise it on appeal before this tribunal. See Smith v. Iversen, 848 
P.2d 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The City also accepts Darby's 
stated standard of review. 
In addition to the three issues presented by Darby, it is 
also appropriate for this court to address a fourth issue: namely, 
that Darby was properly terminated for persistently refusing to 
obey the orders of his superior officers. Although the City 
briefed and argued this issue before the trial court, that court 
did not address this issue in its order of dismissal. This 
appellate court, however, can affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment on any proper ground. See Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 
P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Allphin Realty v. Sine, 595 
P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City agrees with Darby's Statement of the Case. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Michael D. Darby, at all times relevant, was a police 
officer with the Washington Terrace Police Department- See R. 020. 
2. In the fall of 1990, the Department began having serious 
problems with Officer Darby involving his failure to report for 
work when scheduled, his unprofessional appearance of his person 
and his squad car, and his general unwillingness or inability to 
perform his responsibilities as a police officer. See R. 38-39 
(Affidavit of Lt. Richard Cope at paragraph 3). 
3. On December 23, 1990, Officer Darby failed to show up for 
his scheduled shift and appeared approximately five and one-half 
hours late. See R.39 (Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 4). 
4. As a result of the December 23, 1990 incident, Washington 
Terrace Chief of Police Tracy and Lt. Richard Cope met with Officer 
Darby on December 24, 1990. In that meeting, Officer Darby 
admitted his various problems, blamed such problems on his personal 
life and suggested that he receive a written reprimand for being 
late on December 23. See id. 
5. On December 27, Lt. Cope prepared a written report 
regarding the December 23 tardiness of Officer Darby. That report 
was submitted by Lt. Cope to Chief Tracy. See id.; see also R. 47-
48 (Affidavit of Chief Tracy at paragraph 4); R. 52 (Cope's written 
report). 
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6. On December 30, 1990, Officer Darby again did not report 
for work as scheduled and ultimately showed up for work one and 
one-half hours late. See R.39 (Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 5). 
7. As a result of the December 30, 1990 incident, Lt. Cope 
again wrote a report to Chief Tracy regarding Officer Darby's 
tardiness. Id. at paragraph 6; see also R.48 (Affidavit of Tracy 
at paragraph 6) ; R. 54 (Cope's second written report). 
8. As a result of the two tardy incidents, Chief Tracy 
submitted a written warning, dated December 31, 1990, to Officer 
Darby which warning included proposed corrective action on a job 
performance sheet. Chief Tracy indicated that any further 
incidents of Officer Darby's failure to timely report for his shift 
within one year would result in his termination. See R.48 
(Affidavit of Tracy at paragraph 7) ; see also R. 56 (Tracy's 
written warning). 
9. In mid-June of 1991, Lt. Cope assigned a traffic accident 
report to Officer Darby with orders that Darby complete the report 
within the next 30 days. See R. 39 (Affidavit of Cope at 
paragraph 7). 
10. On July 14, 1991, Chief Tracy delivered a written 
reprimand to Officer Darby regarding Officer Darby's failure to 
comply with the corrective action on the job performance sheet 
which had been delivered to Officer Darby on December 31 of 1990. 
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In his written warning of July 14, 1991, Chief Tracy ordered 
Officer Darby to seek personal counseling within the next ten days 
to attempt to straighten out his life. See R. 48-49. (Affidavit 
of Tracy at paragraph 8); see also R. 59 (Tracy's written 
reprimand). 
11. On July 19, 1991, the traffic accident report assigned to 
Officer Darby in mid-June of 1991 had not been completed and Lt. 
Cope then ordered Darby to complete the report immediately. See R. 
39 (Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 8). 
12. On August 1, 1991, Officer Darby showed up late for a 
shooting board meeting. See R. 39 (Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 
9). 
13. On August 2, 1991, Officer Darby showed up 4 5 minutes 
late for his patrol shift. See R. 40 (Affidavit of Cope at 
paragraph 10). 
14. On August 7, 1991, Officer Darby did not show up for a 
shooting qualification meet when he was required to do so, 
requiring him to shoot with the second group later that day. See 
id. (Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 11). 
15. On August 10, 1991, Officer Darby took a 22 caliber rifle 
into evidence from a suspect alleging that he believed it was 
stolen, but failed to indicate this in his report and did not place 
the gun properly into the evidence lock-up. See id. (Affidavit of 
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Cope at paragraph 12). 
16. On August 10, 1991, Officer Darby seized a checkbook as 
evidence, but again failed to properly put the checkbook into the 
evidence loci-up and filled out an inaccurate report indicating 
that the checkbook was, in fact, in the evidence lock-up. See id. 
(Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 13). 
17. On August 13, 1991, Lt. Cope reassigned the checkbook 
case to Officer Gathercoal and again ordered Officer Darby to place 
the checkbook into the evidence lock-up in order for Officer 
Gathercoal to complete the investigation. See id. (Affidavit of 
Cope at paragraph 14). 
18. On August 14, 1991, the owner of the 22 caliber rifle 
asked Officer Darby about the status of the rifle and Officer Darby 
said he had to run the rifle through the office of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms and would get back with the owner. See id. 
(Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 15). 
19. On August 16, 1991, Lt. Cope ordered Officer Darby to 
return the rifle to the owner immediately. See id. (Affidavit of 
Cope at paragraph 16). 
20. On August 18, 1991, Officer Darby was 43 minutes late for 
his patrol shift. See id. R.40-41 (Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 
17). 
21. On August 19, 1991, Lt. Cope again ordered Officer Darby 
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to put the checkbook into the evidence lock-up. See R. 41 
(Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 18). 
22. On August 20, 1991, Lt. Cope obtained an incomplete 
traffic accident report from Officer Darby, discovered that the 
rifle was still in the police office behind a filing cabinet, and 
discovered that the checkbook had been turned in, but that no 
proper evidence slip was included with the checkbook. See id. 
(Affidavit of Cope at paragraph 19). 
23. On August 21, 1991, after reviewing the great number of 
problems that Officer Darby was experiencing during July and August 
1991, Chief Tracy wrote to Officer Darby and ordered him to answer 
various charges of incompetence, ineptitude, and insubordination 
made by other officers. See R. 49 (Affidavit of Tracy at paragraph 
9); see also R. 61 (Tracy's letter of 8/21/91). 
24. Officer Darby responded to Chief Tracy's written report 
with a written letter of August 29, 1991. See id. (Affidavit of 
Tracy at paragraph 10). see also R. 65 (Darby's letter). 
25. On September 3, 1991, Chief Tracy wrote to Officer Darby 
and terminated him based upon various matters contained in his 
letter of August 21 and Darby's response of August 28. See id. at 
paragraph 11; See also R. 70 (Tracy's letter of 9/3/91). 
26. A review board affirmed Chief Tracy's termination of 
Officer Darby pursuant to the procedures of the Washington Terrace 
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Police Department. See R.4 9 at paragraph 12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In Point I of its Argument, the City explains that the 
authorities cited by Darby in his brief are not accepted Utah Law. 
Rather, Utah law indicates that municipalities' interpretations of 
their employment manuals should be deferentially reviewed by trial 
courts. For the purpose of clarity, the City will not constantly 
weave this deferential standard into its arguments made throughout 
its brief. Rather, the City will analyze Darby's termination 
neutrally under Berube v. Fashion Center Ltd., which case and its 
progeny have been accepted by Utah courts as guidance for wrongful 
termination cases in the private sector. 
In Point II of its brief, the City explains that Darby was 
properly dismissed as a police officer for the "less serious 
offense" of consistently failing to report for work on time and for 
the "serious offense" of persistently refusing to follow the 
instructions of a superior officer. With respect to the former 
reason, it is undisputed that the City warned Darby, after he 
reported late for two shifts in December of 1990, that he would be 
terminated if he were late for his shift within the next year. In 
August of 1991, Darby was late for several of his assigned shifts. 
As a result, and pursuant to his warning eight months earlier, 
Darby was terminated from his employment with the City. 
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Darby was also properly terminated for the "serious offense" 
of persistently refusing to obey the orders of his superior 
officers. Beginning in June of 1990, Darby was given at least 
three assignments that he failed to follow through on, despite 
persistent requests for his superior officers to do so. As a 
result of those failures, Darby was dismissed, pursuant to the 
Manual, for the "serious offense" for persistently refusing to obey 
a superior officer, which allows the City to terminate Darby 
without prior warning. 
Finally, In Point III of its brief, the City explains that, 
under Utah Law, the City's findings of fact concerning Darby's 
violations of the Manual's provisions are entitled to deferential 
review by a trial court. Under Russell v. Ocrden Union Railway & 
Depot Co., 122 Utah 107, 247 P.2d 257 (Utah 1952), the City need 
not prove that Darby, in fact, failed to follow his superior 
officers' orders. Rather, the City need only prove that it had 
substantial evidence from which it reasonably concluded that such 
conduct had occurred. The trial court's job, therefore, is to 
determine whether the City acted reasonably in relying on 
substantial evidence in making its decision to terminate Darby. 
Failing some evidence of pretext, Officer Darby cannot reargue the 
veracity of such facts before the trial court and, accordingly, 
such facts could reasonably support his termination as a police officer. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED BY DARBY 
AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS BRIEF DO NOT 
ACCURATELY REFLECT CURRENT UTAH LAW. IN 
FACT, UTAH LAW INDICATES THAT MUNICIPALITIES' 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT MANUALS 
SHOULD BE DEFERENTIALLY REVIEWED BY TRIAL 
COURTS. 
In his brief, Darby sets forth various principles which he 
alleges govern the Personnel Manual at issue in this case. Because 
Darby's claims were plainly deficient even under ordinary contract 
principles, the City assumed for purposes of its motion for summary 
judgment that the Manual constituted a contract between the City 
and Darby. For purposes of clarity, however, certain 
misperceptions in Darby's preamble should be noted. 
First, Darby's assertions overlook the fact that he has 
offered no evidence as to how the Manual came into effect, whether 
it was formally adopted, which department(s) it was intended to 
govern, etc. Absent 'juch evidence, Darby's claim that the manual 
is "binding" on the city has no support. 
Darby's citation to case law from other jurisdictions also 
ignores the special rules governing Darby's employment (and 
termination) as a police officer in a third-class city. Under Utah 
law, members of police departments in cities of the third class are 
not governed by the state classified civil service program. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1001, et seq. Washington Terrace City is a 
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city of the third class, as it has a population of less than 
60,000. See Utah Code Ann, § 10-2-301. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-3-1105, provides: "All 
appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than 
members of the police departments, fire departments, heads of 
departments, and superintendents, shall hold their employment 
without limitation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal 
only as hereinafter provided." This Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have construed that provision as not allowing an appeal (or 
judicial review) of the merits of a discharge from an excepted 
position. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P. 2d 757 (Utah 1990), 
affirming Ward v. Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In Ward, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant Richfield City, which 
had dismissed the plaintiff as the city chief of police. Referring 
to Section 10-3-1105, the Utah Supreme Court noted that, as the 
head of a department, the plaintiff had no right to appeal his 
discharge. See Ward, 798 P. 2d at 759. The same conclusion would be 
required for Darby, a "memberf] of [a] police department," also an 
expressly exempted position under Section 10-3-1105. 
This Court also held in Ward that because the mayor and city 
council had the authority to appoint the plaintiff to the position 
of chief of police, the same body had the inherent authority to 
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dismiss him from that position without a hearing, notice, or cause. 
See Ward, 776 P. 2d at 96. The Court noted that lf[w]hen an 
individual is appointed by an official 'the office is held during 
the pleasure of the authority making the appointment, and ... no 
notice or charges or hearings are required for the suspension or 
removal by the authority appointing the officer./n Id. (citation 
omitted). The statute upon which the Court relied currently 
provides: 
In cities of the third class and towns, the 
chief of police or marshal shall exercise and 
perform such duties as may be prescribed by 
the governing body. The chief of police or 
marshal shall be under the direction, control 
and supervision of the mayor. The chief of 
police or marshal may with the consent of the 
mayor, appoint assistants to the chief of 
police or marshal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918 [formerly 10-3-916] (emphasis 
provided). 
Under this Court's analysis in Ward, the fact that the 
Washington Terrace police chief had the statutory authority to 
appoint subordinates necessarily granted him the authority to 
discharge the same subordinates without notice, hearing or cause. 
The chief's inherent authority to appoint and dismiss cannot be 
restricted by a city's adoption of a general personnel manual. In 
Hutchison v. Cartwriaht, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah 1984), a sheriff fired 
one of his deputies for alleged misconduct during a deposition. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld summary judgment for the county on a 
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wrongful discharge suit brought by the deputy. Among other 
holdings, the court reaffirmed that the statutory authority to 
appoint necessarily includes the power to dismiss without notice or 
hearings. See Hutchison, 692 P.2d at 773-74. The appellant, 
however, argued that ,f[t]he sheriff voluntarily limited his 
authority by adopting the Beaver County Personnel Policy as the 
internal policy of the sheriff's department.11 See id. at 774. The 
Supreme Court rejected that theory, stating there was no evidence 
that the county's policies and procedures were 
adopted and ratified either formally or 
informally by the sheriff as binding on his 
department in all cases. Nor is there 
anything in the records suggesting that any 
county ordinance adopted by the Beaver County 
commissioners made the policy applicable to 
the sheriff's department. The mere 
utilization of part of a county procedure by 
the sheriff in one particular instance cannot 
be equated by adoption of the entire policy of 
which that procedure is a part. Under such 
circumstances, we cannot say that the sheriff 
has relinquished his power to summarily 
discharge. 
Id. 
The Hutchison court's conclusion that county commissioners 
could not unilaterally restrict the sheriff's inherent authority to 
appoint and dismiss deputies applies with equal force in this case, 
where the police chief was statutorily empowered to appoint 
subordinates. The Manual in this case does not include any 
language indicating an intent to override the inherent authority to 
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appoint and dismiss certain positions in certain departments.1 
In addition to its silence regarding the special principles 
governing police officers in cities of the third class, Darby's 
brief fails to recognize the widely held principle that deference 
is given to the interpretation of a municipal ordinance by those 
charged with administering it. See Texas National Theaters, Inc. 
v. City of Albuquerque, 97 N.M. 282, 639 P.2d 569, 573 (1982); 
Fisher v. City of Gresham, 69 Or.App. 411, 685 P.2d 486, 489 
(1984) ; Eastlake Community Council v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash.App. 
273, 823 P.2d 1132 (1992), review denied, 119 Wash.2d 1005, 832 
P.2d 488 (1992). Courts generally refuse to 
intrude into or interfere with the 
discretionary functions or the policies of 
other departments of government. Accordingly, 
the courts will not so interfere with the 
actions of a city council unless its action is 
outside of its authority or is so wholly 
discordant to reason and justice that its 
action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary 
and thus in violation of the complainant's 
rights. 
Triangle Oil, Inc. v, North Salt Lake Corp., 609 P.2d 1338, 1340 
(Utah 1980). A "reasonable latitude of judgment and discretion is 
essential" for local governments to exercise their express and 
1
 It is doubtful whether a personnel manual purporting to 
restrict such statutory authority could be valid. A city may not 
attempt to enact ordinances conflicting with state statutory 
provisions. See State v. Hutchinson, 624 P. 2d 1116, 1121 (Utah 
1980); Hutchinson v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah 1984). 
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implied powers. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P. 2d 1116, 1124 (Utah 
1980). 
To sustain a claim arising out of the City's selection and 
interpretation of its own personnel manual, a claimant must 
overcome the presumption of reasonableness and deference given to 
the City's implementation of that function. In this case, Darby's 
claims were plainly deficient even under ordinary contract 
principles. Consequently, the district court was not asked to 
apply the special rules which ordinarily would apply in light of 
Darby's position as a police officer in a third-class city. The 
court found that no genuine issue of material fact existed, and 
that the City was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
For the reasons set forth below, this Court should affirm. 
POINT II: OFFICER DARBY WAS PROPERLY TERMINATED 
FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE WASHINGTON 
TERRACE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
Under Utah law, assuming that Darby was not an at-will 
employee, and assuming public employees are subject to at least the 
same laws as private employees, Darby could be terminated from his 
employment by the Washington Terrace Police Chief pursuant to the 
terms of his employment contract. See Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1044-46, 1050 (Utah 1989). An employee's 
employment contract can consist of any representation made to the 
employee concerning the terms of his or her employment as contained 
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in personnel manuals. See id. In this case, Darby's discharge 
comports with the guidelines set forth in the Washington Terrace 
Police Personnel Manual. See Exhibit "C11 to Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(hereinafter "the Manual") (This document is attached to the Record 
on Appeal but is not separately paginated). 
The Manual, under the section governing "Personnel Discipline 
Procedures" provides: 
Grounds for discipline. A peace officer 
holding a permanent appointment may be demot-
ed, reduced in pay, suspended, or discharged, 
for: 
a. Noglect of duty; 
b. Disobedience of a reasonable order; 
c. Misconduct; 
d. Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily 
perform assigned duties. . . . 
See Manual at p. 18. Additionally, the Manual also provides 
factors for evaluating the penalties for each offense. See id. at 
page 13. The Manual provides that a member of the police force may 
be "discharged" without warning for any "serious offense" committed 
by the police officer. Id. The Manual defines "serious offenses" 
as "stealing, striking supervisor, harming others or property, 
persistently refusing to obey, and illegal conduct." Id. (Emphasis 
added). For "less serious offenses," which the Manual does not 
15 
define, the penalties include imposition of progressive 
disciplinary procedures. Id. However, such progressive discipline 
procedures can result ultimately in "discharge11 of the police 
officer. Id. 
A. Officer Darby Was Properly Discharged From 
His Employment Based Upon His "Less Serious 
Offenses" of Consistently Failing to Report 
for Work on Time. 
As indicated above, police officers may be discharged for 
"less serious offenses" provided that progressive discipline first 
take place with respect to those offenses. As indicated in the 
Statement of Facts, Officer Darby reported late for two different 
shifts on December 23, 1990 and December 30, 1990. See R. 20, 
paragraph 20, and R. 21, paragraph 6. As a result of those two 
failures to report for his shift on time, Officer Darby was 
reprimanded and warned that a similar failure within one year's 
time could result in his termination. See R. 21 at paragraph 8. 
From August 1, 1991 chrough August 18, 1991, Officer Darby was 
again late for several of his shifts. See R. 22, paragraph 14, and 
R. 23, paragraph 21. Those failures to report for his shift, 
together with his prior reprimand and warning, properly supported 
his dismissal. 
1. The Manual does not mandate that discipline 
take place immediately after the violation has 
occurred. However, assuming the Manual does 
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mandate timely discipline, Darby's dismissal 
complied with the Manual's advisory language. 
In Point 1 of his Brief, styled "Timely Discipline,11 Darby 
argues that the City did not timely discipline him following the 
four occasions on which he reported late for duty during August of 
1991. See Appellant's Brief, Point I, Pages 21-23. Apparently, 
Darby believes that he should have been terminated immediately 
after any one of the four tardy incidences rather than on August 
21, 1991. Darby's alleged support for that argument is based on 
the personnel discipline procedures found in the Manual. See Brief 
of Appellant at Page 23. Darby, however, has misquoted the 
provision which he relies upon in making this argument to read: 
"Discipline shall be administered as soon after the need for action 
is discovered and confirmed as due process will allow." See id. 
(Emphasis added). That provision, however, actually reads that 
"Discipline should be administered as soon after the need for 
action is discovered and as due process will allow." See Manual at 
page 11, paragraph D (emphasis added). Therefore, the Manual's 
language is advisory, not mandatory. See Thurston v. Box Elder 
County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Manual does require "timely" 
discipline, the undisputed facts indicate that Darby was timely 
disciplined. Darby has acknowledged that on December 31, 1990, he 
was reprimanded, demoted, and placed on a one-year probation with 
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the warning that if there were "any further incidents of failure to 
report within one-year, you will be terminated." See R. 121, 
paragraph 10. Darby also has admitted that "any one of the cited 
August 1991 violations could sustain Darby's dismissal without 
further warning." R. 137. Three days after his August 18, 
failure to timely report for work, Darby was issued a "failure to 
take corrective action" memorandum by Chief Tracy which served as 
a basis for his termination on September 3. See R.49, R.63. 
Therefore, Darby was timely disciplined for his repeated tardiness 
pursuant to the prior warning and the one-year probation. 
2. The City did not "warehouse" unrecorded 
violations to support its termination of 
Darby. 
In Point 2 of his Brief, Darby alleges that "a necessary 
consequence of the City's failure to timely discipline Darby for 
his tardiness during August 1991 was that unrecorded violations 
accrued under the Manual." See Brief of Appellant, page 23. As 
such, according to Darby, that failure to timely enforce discipline 
against Darby "resultad in Manual defined supervisor acquiescence 
for Darby's tardiness on August 1, 2 and 7, 1991." See id. To 
support his argument, Darby relies on Section 1-19 of the Manual 
which states: 
A superior officer cannot use several minor 
infractions of a subordinate as justification 
for a major disciplinary action if no recorded 
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action has been taken in the past for the 
violation of the minor infractions. 
See Manual, p. 29, Section 1-19. Darby's reliance on Section 1-19 
is misplaced. As quoted above, that section provides that several 
minor infractions cannot justify major disciplinary actions unless 
documented disciplinary action was taken in the past. As explained 
above, however, Darby's past infractions were documented. In fact, 
Darby was expressly warned that further absenteeism or tardiness 
within one year would result in his termination. Thus, the 
dictates of Section 1-19 were met and the City was justified in 
terminating Darby based upon the prior warning it had given him. 
3. Darby's termination was neither sporadic nor 
inconsistent with the Manual's advisory 
provisions. 
In Point 3 of his Brief, Darby argues that his termination in 
August was an inconsistent and sporadic enforcement of the warning 
he was given eight months earlier. As explained above, that 
warning advised Darby that he would be terminated if he were late 
for his shift within one-year. 
In support of his argument concerning sporadic and 
inconsistent enforcement of the Manual's provisions, Darby relies 
on four grounds: first, Darby relies on the "warnings" provision 
found on page 14 of the Manual which advises that "for minor 
infractions, superior officers should warn members, orally or in 
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writing, what to expect if the infraction were to occur again.11 See 
Manual p. 14, paragraph 5 (emphasis added). Second, Darby relies 
on the "lax enforcement of rules" paragraph of the Manual which 
advises that "law enforcement administrators should consider past 
enforcement of a rule and how widely the rule has been disseminated 
and is known among members in deciding a just and proper 
disciplinary procedure." See Manual p. 14, paragraph 6 (emphasis 
added). Third, Darby relies on his characterization of comments 
made by the trial judge on June 16, 1993 during the court's bench 
ruling. See Brief of Appellant, page 25. Fourth, Darby relies on 
several of his answers to the City's interrogatories which 
allegedly show treatment of other officers inconsistent with his 
termination. 
In response to the first two grounds of Darby's argument, it 
is clear that each provision relied on by Darby is advisory not 
mandatory. See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P. 2d 165, 169, 
(Utah 1992). As such, neither of those provisions are inconsistent 
with the City's warning and subsequent termination of Darby. 
Furthermore, the Manual specifically provides that an officer's 
past record may be considered when imposing appropriate 
disciplinary measures. See Manual, p. 13, paragraph 2. That 
provision also provides that the "type, frequency and pattern" of 
past offenses are valid considerations in weighing appropriate 
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disciplinary measures. See id. Together, these three provisions 
allow superior officers a degree of flexibility in fashioning 
appropriate forms of discipline based upon the officer's past 
offenses. Rather than accept this fact, Darby argues that his 
interests would be better served had he been terminated immediately 
after his first failure to report for shift on August 1, 1991. His 
argument, however, is unsupported by the actual language of the 
Manual. 
Darby's third ground for his "sporadic and inconsistent" 
argument is based on his rendition of the trial court's dicta 
during its June 16, 1993 bench ruling. According to Darby: 
The trial court stated that the City was not 
obligated to strictly enforce the disciplinary 
action provisions of the Manual and that it 
had not done so because of concern and 
sympathy for Darby's professional and personal 
circumstances. 
See Brief of Appellant at p. 25. This court must legitimately 
question Darby's rendition of the trial court's language. To get 
the full flavor of the trial court's words, it is necessary to 
examine the actual text of the trial court's bench ruling: 
In this case we have egregious examples of 
tardiness, with the first two instances in 
particular. And it seems to the court that 
the actions taken by the City were within 
generally the intent and spirit of the Manual, 
of trying to work with the officer, let him 
know that the can't show up for work five and 
a half hours or an hour and a half late. 
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And that he was given progressive discipline 
in the sense that he was warned. He had a 
meeting with the chief and his Lieutenant 
supervisor. He was given a written reprimand. 
When he didn't solve that problem he was 
demoted. He was demoted from a Sergeant, 
which is a severe reprimand but it is short of 
terminating him. That he was warned at that 
time very specifically if you continue with 
that behavior you will be terminated. 
And counsel tries to turn the argument that, 
well he shouldn't have been terminated because 
it is until July and August before that 
problem comes up again, and when the problem 
first surfaces he is not terminated 
immediately. I think that it is human nature 
for employers to try and not terminate people. 
They know they have got a Manual. I think 
they want to avoid legal problems. But also I 
think they have the individual's situation in 
mind. 
And again, what happened here is that the 
officer, as I recall the facts, starts out 
with some tardiness not as serious as it got 
to be by the month of August and that the 
City, until they are pushed to that point, 
they don't terminate him. But at that point 
they step back and look at everything that has 
happened, and based on their progressive 
discipline of him decide that they have had 
enough, and terminated him. 
See June 16, 1993, Bench Ruling (Addendum to Appellant's Brief). 
As this court can easily see, the trial court's actual 
language differs remarkably from Darby's rendition. The trial 
court was not, as suggested by Darby, construing the Manual to read 
any differently that it actually does. 
The fourth ground for Darby's "sporadic and inconsistent" 
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argument relies on his answers to certain interrogatories. See 
Brief of Appellant at p. 25. However, Darby never explains how 
those answers to interrogatories support any inconsistent or 
sporadic enforcement of the Manual's provisions as applied against 
him. In fact, Darby never addresses the fact that any other 
officers received the same warning he received and had it carried 
out any differently than it was carried out with respect to Darby. 
More fundamentally, however, and as explained above, the Manual's 
provisions relied upon by Darby are advisory and allow superior 
officers some leeway in fashioning appropriate remedies for various 
offenses. As explained above, Darby's past conduct with respect to 
absenteeism and tardiness was quite extensive. His past record 
figured heavily into his termination. In fact, officer Darby had 
prior notice that any future tardiness would result in his 
termination. Despite that notice, Darby failed to timely report to 
work and ultimately was terminated as a result of that tardiness. 
Similarly, and as explained below, despite persistent requests to 
carry out his assignments, Darby failed to comply with his 
superior's orders. 
4. Darby offers no evidence that his termination 
was an "excessive penalty." In fact, Darby 
failed to raise this argument with the trial 
court and, accordingly, cannot do so on 
appeal. 
Darby's fourth Point is styled "Excessive Penalty." Darby 
23 
offers no specific argument or evidence to support his position. 
Rather, he alleges generally that his dismissal was an excessive 
penalty. Darby never raised this allegation with the trial court 
and, therefore, he is precluded from arguing this issue on appeal. 
See Smith v. Iversen, 848 P.2d 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
As explained by the City throughout this brief, Darby is 
attempting to avoid the consequence of a very clear warning in 
December of 1990 that he would be terminated within the following 
year if he again reported late for any of his shifts. Rather than 
accept that consequence, Darby attempts to impose an interpretation 
of the Manual which is unsupported by both the Manual's language as 
well as Utah law. Simply stated, it is not an excessive penalty to 
be terminated after being warned that such termination will take 
place in the event that certain conditions occur. Darby, not the 
City, caused that condition to occur. 
B. Darby Was Properly Discharged For His 
Persistent Refusal to Obey the Directives 
of His Superior Officers. 
As indicated above, the persistent refusal of an officer to 
obey departmental directives is considered a "serious offense" for 
which the police officer may be discharged without warning. See 
Appellee's Brief, supra, at page 15. At least three of the facts 
outlined in the Statement of Facts rise to the level of failing to 
obey a direct order of a superior officer and would warrant Darby's 
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dismissal including: First, Officer Darby failed to complete an 
accident report within the time period given by Lt. Cope and 
further failed to properly finish that report after being reminded 
that he was delinquent in doing so. See R. 21, paragraph 10, R. 22 
paragraph 12, and R. 23, paragraph 23. Second, Officer Darby 
failed to properly place a checkbook into evidence and failed to 
properly fill out a report indicating the checkbook was in 
evidence. See R. 22-23, paragraph 17. Furthermore, Officer Darby 
twice failed to place the checkbook into evidence after being 
ordered to do so by Lt. Cope on August 13, 1991 and August 19, 
1991. See R. 23. paragraph 23. Third, Officer Darby seized a 22 
caliber rifle, but failed to indicate such seizure on his report 
and did not put the gun properly into the evidence lock-up. See R. 
22, paragraph 16. Additionally, Officer Darby refused to respond 
to a direct order of August 16, 1991, by Lt. Cope who ordered Darby 
to return the rifle to its owner immediately. See R. 23, paragraph 
20. That gun was subsequently found in a detective's office on 
August 20, 1991. See R. 23, paragraph 23. 
Based upon these three incidents of persistently refusing to 
obey orders, Officer Darby could be discharged without warning. 
Accordingly, his termination was justified. 
It is important to note that Darby was given prior notice of 
his persistent refusal to obey and his termination was timely. As 
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acknowledged by Darby, during the mid part of January 1991, Chief 
Tracy delivered to Darby a "Corrective Action on Job Performance 
memorandum requesting that Darby. . . timely complete required 
reports and assigned duties." See R. 121, paragraph 12. Darby, 
therefore, had received prior notice to timely complete his 
assigned duties. Despite that prior notice, the record clearly 
indicates that Darby failed to timely carry out orders to return 
the checkbook (orders given August 13 and 19) , to return a rifle to 
its owner or to put it into the evidence lock-up (order given 
August 16), and failed to carry out an order given in mid-June to 
timely complete an action report by July 19. Each of these three 
incidents demonstrates a persistent refusal to carry out the 
requests of superior officers. 
Darby's disciplinary measures were timely enforced with 
respect to these violations. Darby acknowledges that he received 
a "failure to take corrective action" memorandum from Chief Tracy 
on August 21. That memorandum asked Darby to respond to various 
allegations. That memorandum was issued only five days after Darby 
failed to comply with an order to return the rifle and seven days 
after he failed to comply with an order to return the checkbook. 
Therefore, Darby's discharge was timely and occurred after Darby 
had received prior notice of his need to timely complete his 
duties. 
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POINT III. FACTUAL ISSUES WERE RESOLVED BY CHIEF 
TRACY AND THE REVIEW BOARD. UNDER UTAH 
LAW, THOSE FINDINGS ARE TO BE DEFERENTIALLY 
REVIEWED BY THIS COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE BASIS, 
It is undisputed that the facts surrounding Darby's 
termination were reviewed by both Chief Tracy and the Review Board. 
Those two entities each had an opportunity to review the facts as 
related by each party and to base their decisions upon those 
independent reviews. Under Utah law, the conclusions of such 
independent fact finders are entitled to deference by the trial 
court. See Russell v. Oqden Union Ry. & Depot and Co. , 122 Utah 
107, 247 P.2d 257 (Utah 1952). 
In Russell v. Oqden Union Ry. & Depot and Co., supra, the 
plaintiff-employee was employed under a union contract which 
provided that no yardman could be suspended or dismissed without 
first having a fair and impartial hearing and his guilt 
established. The employee had the right to be represented by an 
employee of his or her choice. If dismissal was found to be 
unjust, the employee would be reinstated and paid for all time 
lost. See Russell, 247 P.2d at 258. 
In Russell, an appropriate hearing had been held and the 
company hearing officer had found that the employee was properly 
terminated. On appeal, the employee argued that before the court 
could uphold the firing, the evidence in court must reveal the 
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employee's guilt. The Utah Supreme Court rejected that contention 
stating that in any investigation or hearing there must be a trier 
of fact. In disciplinary matters, the trier of fact is the 
investigating officer and/or the review board of the employer. 
The Russell court considered that if the trier of fact's 
investigation reveals that the charges made were without substance 
or were inconsequential, or that the supporting evidence would not 
justify disciplinary action, then any finding made by the trier of 
fact would not support the disciplinary action. The credibility of 
the witnesses is one of the things which the trier of fact must 
decide. However, the fact finder may not arbitrarily disbelieve 
credible evidence or base a finding upon mere suspicion or 
conjecture. See Russell, 247 P. 2d at 261-62. If the facts 
reasonably support the employer's decision, the trial court may not 
second-guess the employer's conclusion that the employee had 
violated the terms or conditions of his or her employment contract. 
Under Russell, the City need not prove that Darby, in fact, 
failed to follow his supervisor's requests or orders. Rather, the 
City need only prove that it had substantial evidence from which it 
reasonably concluded that such conduct had occurred. It is not the 
trial court's job in a wrongful termination case to determine 
whether the employee did or did not violate the terms of his or her 
employment contract. Rather, the trial court's sole job is to 
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determine whether the employer acted reasonably in relying on 
substantial evidence in making its determination that the employee 
had so acted. 
It is undisputed that Darby had an opportunity to present his 
side of the story, his version of facts, and his theory as to why 
he was terminated to both Chief Tracy and the Review Board. Both 
Tracy and the Board based their decision on evidence presented by 
Darby. Having done so, under Russell, this Court must review that 
decision with deference. Accordingly, this Court can conclude that 
Chief Tracy and the Review Board reasonably relied upon substantial 
evidence and reached a reasonable conclusion based upon such facts. 
Failing some evidence of pretext, Officer Darby cannot reargue the 
veracity of such facts before this tribunal. 
CONCLUSION 
Darby was properly terminated by Washington Terrace City. The 
City had warned Darby that any further failures to report for his 
shift on time within one year would result in his termination. 
Subsequently, Darby reported late for his shifts. Consequently, he 
was terminated by the City pursuant to its warning. Darby was also 
properly terminated for persistently refusing to obey the direct 
orders of superior officers in failing to carry out several 
assignments given to nim in July and August of 1991. 
The City's decision to terminate Darby was properly supported 
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by the Manual and properly based on substantial evidence. The 
City's review of that evidence is entitled deference by the trial 
court and the City's interpretation of its Manual's provisions are 
also to be deferentially reviewed* Even without such deference, 
however, it is clear that Darby was terminated pursuant to a clear 
warning which he admits receiving. Therefore, this court should 
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing 
Darby's case as a matter of law. 
DATED this /& day of March, 1994. 
CH^J^TENSEl^IgNSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Lee C. Hennmg 
David C. Richards 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee to be mailed, postage prepaid 
thereon, to the following, this day of March, 1994: 
Phillip C. Patterson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM: 
June 16, 1993 Bench Ruling of the Second Judicial 
District Court for Weber County, Utah Granting the 
Summary Judgment Motion of the Defendant Washington 
Terrace, the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
MICHAEL D. DARBY, 
Case No.920900158 
Plaintiff 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
-vs-
WASHINGTON TERRACE CITY 
Defendant 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came c 
for hearing before the Hon. MICHAEL J. GLASMANN, Judge of Li 
above entitled Court on June 16, 1993. 
WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had and the 
following testimony was adduced, to wit: 
A p p e a r a n c e s : 
PHILIP PATTERSON, ESQ., and FINDLY P. GRIDLEY, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff; 
LEE C. HENNING, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant-
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THE COURT: The Court is going to grant the Motion 
for Summary Judgment and make some observations. 
First of all, I think that counsel for the Plaintiff is 
taking a hypertechnical, unrealistic view of the manual 
enforcement. No offense to you, Mr. Patterson, just in terns 
of the argument. The Court believes in viewing this that you 
can have different, degrees of tardiness. 
In this case we have very egregious examples of 
tardiness, with the first two instances in particular. And :t 
seems to the Court that the actions taken by the City were 
within generally the intent and the spirit of the manual, of 
trying to work with the officer, let him know that he can't 
show up for work five and a half hours late, or an hour and a 
half late. 
And that he was given progressive discipline in the ser.3e: 
that he was warned. He had a meeting with the Chief and his 
lieutenant supervisor. He was given a written reprimand. 
That when he didn!t solve that problem that he was demoted. 
He was demoted from a sergeant, which is a severe reprimand 
but it is short of terminating him. That he was warned at 
that time very specifically if you continue with that behavior 
you will be terminated. 
And counsel tries to turn the argument that, well he 
shouldn't have been terminated because it is until July and 
August before that problem comes up again, and when the 
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problem first surfaces he is not terminated immediately. I 
think that it is human nature for employers to try and not 
terminate people. They know they have got a manual. I think 
they want to avoid legal problems. But also I think they have 
the individual's situation in mind. 
And again, what happened here is that the officer, as I 
recall the facts, starts out with some tardiness that's not as 
serious as it got to be by the month of August. And that the 
City, until they are pushed to that point, they don't 
terminate him. But a that point they step back and look at 
everything that's happened, and based on their progressive 
discipline of him decide they have had enough, and terminated 
him. 
And the Court is satisfied by the undisputed facts. I 
don't think on that issue that there is a factual dispute. As 
I have heard both of you argue and I have read your memos, iz 
seems to me those facts are not in dispute. 
Based on that, I think Summary Judgment is appropriate. 
Also with regard to the insubordination, there may be an 
argument that there is a factual issue based on the different 
viewpoint as to how—as to why the officer acted the way he 
did with respect to getting a traffic report done, with 
respect to handling a rifle and a checkbook. It appeared thai: 
from a procedural point of view the Defendant—the Plaintiff 
was certainly given due process of understanding what the 
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City's position was. What his employer's position was, I 
should say. And then he was given a review hearing. At 
that—at that review hearing those facts were reviewed, and it 
was concluded that he was insubordinate. And that was also a 
ground that was used to sustain his termination. 
My decision doesn't require that I get to that point 
today because I thin}: just based on the tardiness alone that 
that was sufficient basis for his termination as I have 
already stated. 
And so, counsel, I will have to say that if in fact the 
appropriate position for this Court is to take an appellate 
court review of what the review committee did, then I don't 
have any problem with saying that there was insubordination 
found. And it appears from the record that there is an ample 
basis for that finding. I don't find a problem with that 
finding. 
Mr. Patterson makes an argument though about the City 
members being involved in that decision process. If in face 
he is right, there could be a problem I suppose with them not 
being as independent of the City's interests as that review 
panel should be. And if that were the case, I would have to 
say then from a Summary Judgment point of view that on the 
issue of insubordination, I don't know that I could say, 
viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Officer Darby, 
.that I can grant Summary Judgment on that at this time. I can 
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if your argument is correct that I take an appellate review 
position on that. Do you understand my position? 
MR. HENNING: I do. 
THE COURT: All right. With that explanation, I 
will ask you to prepare the Order for the Court. 
Is there anything else, counsel? 
MR. HENNING: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
County of Weber ) 
I, James N. Jones, do hereby certify that I am one of the 
Official Court Reporters for the State of Utah, and a 
competent machine shorthand writer. 
That on June 16, 1993, I reported in machine shorthand 
the proceedings had and testimony given in the case entitled 
Michael D. Darby vs. Washington Terrace City. 
That thereafter, I reduced my machine shorthand notes to 
typewriting, and the foregoing transcript, pages 1 through 5, 
inclusive, constitutes a full, true and correct transcript of 
the proceedings had and testimony given at said time and 
place. 
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand this 15th 
day of September, 1993. 
20 I JAMES N. JONES 
Official Court Reporter 
ADDENDUM: 
September 3, 1993 Order of Dismissal from the 
Second Judicial District Court for Weber County, 
Utah, The Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, Judge 
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Lee C. Henning, #4593 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P. C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL D..DARBY, 
Plaintiff, 
WASHINGTON TERRACE CITY, 
a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
Oral argument on Washington Terrace's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was heard on June 16, 1993. Plaintiff appeared personally 
and through his counsel of record, Phillip Patterson. Washington 
Terrace appeared through its counsel of record, Lee C. Henning. 
After considering the briefs and affidavits on file and 
hearing the argument of counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The 
grounds f.or this dismissal are that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact regarding plaintiff's tardiness and defendant could 
dismiss plaintiff on that basis. Plaintiff's arguments in this 
*§H 2 ^ 3M 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
<cfP. 
C i v i l No. 920900158 
Judge David Roth 
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regard are hyper-technical and do not follow the spirit or the 
letter of the employment manual. 
Having dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on the tardiness 
grounds, it is not necessary to reach defendant's second argument, 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact that plaintiff 
could be dismissed for insubordination. 
DATED this J^Sday of C v ^ i ^ ? i ^ 1993 , 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , 
Honorable ^i^hael Glassman 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ( £ day of June, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed first-class, postace 
prepaid to: 
Phillip C. Patterson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM: 
Cited portions of Washington Terrace Police 
Personnel Manual 
PERSONNEL DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES 
GENERAL 
INTRODUCTION 
The subject of disciplinary procedures is one that impacts on all employees. 
Any organization must have a fair ard orderly' system of discipline to operate 
effectively. Failure to establish end maintain proper disciplinary procedures 
subjects a department to a serious loss in potential productivity through low 
moral, work loss, and high employee turnover. 
PURPOSE 
1. Management has the responsibility to establish the rules and regulations 
necessary to ensure the attainment of the orgainzation's goals or mission 
end to protect the welfare of the organization's members. 
2. No organization can effectively function without discipline. This is 
particularly true in law enforce:ent. Peace officers_work_in_£n_atinos=_ 
P[]?I?_^h-ictLfinds them strongly pressured to maintain law, order and 
security in society, while constantly remaining under the threat of. civil, 
liability and public scrutiny. The accomplishment of this mission is 
possible only with-effective discipline. 
3. Discipline provides a -frame-work which allows members the ccnfldence and 
security of knowing the requirerents of, and processes for enforcement 
of, department policy and procedure. 
DISCIPLINE DEFINED 
1. Discipline for the purposes of tiiis paper is defined as a continuing 
state of good order ancTbehavior. It encourages an individual or grouo 
to observe rules, regulations,and procedures that- are deemed necessary 
to the attainment of a departmental goal and/or objective. 
2. Discipline is that instruction, training,supervision and ccnn~r.d of 
members with respect to behavior which results in acceptable job per-
formance and morale. 
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DISCIPLINE 
1. The application of discipline is both negative arid positive. 
2. "Positive" discipline is applied through-training, direction, super-
vision, entrustment of responsibilities and motivation and has as .an 
objective, the building of moral,"esprit de corps", professionalism 
and desire to take the proper ac:ion under all circumstances, whether 
under direct supervision or not. 
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3. "Negative" discipline relies upon fear of the consequences of failing 
to obey rules and regulations or carry out department policy. Negative. 
discipline is aplied when positive discipline lacks the desired effec-
tiveness, is inappropriate under the existing circumstances or the mis-
conduct is too serious to handle any other way. 
MORALE 
JL One of the most important reasons for effective discipline is the de-
veloping and maintaining of positive morale on the department. 
2. For discipline to be a morale builder," the discipline must be legally 
consistent, fair, timely and appropriate. 
A. Legal: A law enforcement administrator cannot discipline any 
employee contrary to state or federal law. discipline procedures 
•must-not viclate the employee's federal civil rights. To do other 
wise places the" supervisor in jeopardy "of substantial liability. 
B. ConsistentTThelsporatic, inconsistent application of discipline 
leaves the impression that the disciplinary prccess is selective 
and unreliacle.and that it applies only to seme members while ex-
empting others. A consistent, fairly administered disciplinary policy 
will result in higher moral and increase compliance with department 
policy and procedure 
C. Fair:' The acceptance and support of the disciplinary process by 
department -embers and success of that policy in the face of Judicial 
review requires application of due process and fair play. 
D. Timely: Discipline should be administered as scon after the need 
for action is discovered and confirmed as due process will allow. 
Speedy due process and action increases the effectiveness of disciplne. 
E. Appropriate: Action shall be taken according to the objectives of 
discipline, combining both positive and negative aspects of discipline. 
Action taken should reflect the seriousness of the misconduct, the 
past recorc of the member's conduct ana an aporaisal of the most recent 
methods of altering the member's behavior or performance. 
ESTABLISHING DISCIPLINE
 0 
V 
Ten steps are ordinarily considered necessary in a prcper disciplinary rccedure: 
1) Is it a reasonable rule? 
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2) Is it a legal rule(re: employees c:/il rights)? 
3) Is it a fair rule? 
A) Has it been properly communicated? 
5) Has it been consistently enforced? 
6) Has enforcement been timely? ( The length of time between the time 
the offense was discovered and the time that discipline took place.) 
7) Has there been a thorough and unbised investigation? 
8) Is there adequate proof/evidence? 
9) Has there been a proper hearing of trie evidence with rights of 
appeal? 
10) Is it the proper penalty in view of all relevant considerations? 
NOTE: If an administrator's disciplinary .Eition is challenged in court,"the 
court will examine all of these concepts ir determining-if-the-admi-nistrator's 
decision will be allowed to stand, 
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS 
Any employee who suffers an adverse action is entitled to administrative due 
process to ensure fairness and equity. Adninistrative due process generally 
includes the right of the affected person D : 
1) Be informed in writing, of charges or complaint giving rise to the 
disciplinary action. 
2) Reply to the charges. 
3) To have the reply considered by thf administration. 
4) To have a hearing on the matter. 
5) To receive a decision within a reasnable amount of time. 
6) To appeal to a higher body for a nview of the decision.. 
7) The hearing must be before an objezive, competent, and fair-minded 
authority, where the affected part:- can be represented, introduce 
evidence through documents and teslmony, cross-examine witnesses, 
and where an objective and verbatim cbpy-'of the proceedings is made. 
SLNMARY OF RULE VIOLATION AND PENALTIES FOUND IN 'THIS SECTION 
1. The types of rule violations will inchde, but not be limited'to, the 
following: Unauthorized absenteeism, :ardiness, loafing, leaving post, 
sleeping on the job, assault and fightjig, horseplay, insubordination, 
\Z 
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SuNf^iARY OF RULE VIOLATION AND PENALTIES FOUND IN THIS SECTION (cont.) 
ausive language, threat or assault,falsifying records, falsifying app-
lication, dishonesty, theft, disloyalty, crit icism of superior officers 
aid department operations, negligence, unauthorized,hair styles, 
cama: :o property, possession or use of -drugs or intoxicants on duty, obscene 
cr immoral conduct (unbecoming conduct), gambling, citizen complaints, non-
payment of debts, bribes and gratuities, low performance, and incompetence. 
2. Also, the types of penalties w i l l include warnings (verbal and written), 
suspensions, discharge, demotion, transfer, medical certificates, public 
apologies, and reassignment. 
FACTORS IN EVALUATING PENALTIES 
1. Nature of the Offense 
A. Serious Offenses 
1) Stealing, striking supervisor, harming others or property, 
persistently rerusing to ooey, illegal conduct. 
2) For these types of offenses a member may be discharged without 
warning. 
B. Less Serious Offenses. 
1) Calls for milder penalty aimed at correction. 
2) Progressive, positive discipline. 
3) Supervisor should notify person of wrong and offer assistance, 
warn before suspension, suspension before discharge. 
C. Degree of penalty should be in keeping with the seriousness of the 
offense. 
2. Merger's Past Record. 
In considering appropriate disciplinary measures, the discipline hearing 
board (DHB) or a superior officer, including the chief executive, may 
take into account the past record of the member. However, the superior 
officer, chief executive or the DH3 may. not justify any disciplinary 
measures of past acts of the member for which he was not notified and/ 
or confronted, which notice or confrontation gave the member a fair op-
portunity to reply.- The type, frequency, end pattern of past offenses 
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FACTORS IN EVALUATING PENALTIES (cont.) 
are valid considerations the superior officer, chief executive, or the 
DHB may weigh in deciding an appropriate disciplinary measure. 
3. Length of Service. 
In considering appropriate disciplinary measures, a superior officer, 
chief executive or the DHB -may examine the length and quality of service 
ihe member has given to the department. 
A. Knowledge of the rules 
In considering appropriate disciplinary measures,a superior officer, the 
ciief executive or the DHB may examine the member's knowledge of the rules, 
the reasonableness of the rules, and the consistency of the department's 
enforcement of the rules in arriving at_a-proper-penalty for the offense. 
5. Warnings 
Tie failure of supervisors to give warnings is a prime reason the courts 
have not sustained many law enforcement disciplinary actions in the pas;. 
For minor infractions, superior officers should warn members, orally or 
in writing, what to expect if the infraction were to occur again. However, 
n r serious offenses (morally or legally wrong) the cnief executive may 
reccmmend termination of the member to the disciplire hearing board wit> 
CJt the benefit of any warnings. Warnings can be oral or written and 
sr.ould be witnessed and initialed by the subject. 
6. Lax Enforcement of Rules 
Law enforcement administrators should consicer pas: enforcement of a 
rule and how widely the rule has been disseminated ana is known among 
t:e members in deciding a just and proper disciplinary procedure. Lax 
enforcement in the past should have a mitigation effect to the benefit 
of the member. However, an administrator may begin strict enforcement 
of a lax rule after giving all members clear notice of intent. 
7. Unequal or Discriminatory Treatment. 
Assessment of discipline must be consistently applied unless reasonable 
basis exists for variations. Written directives should be updated and 
\ A 
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FACTORS IN EVALUATING PENALTIES (cont.) 
current and should reasonably reflect the daily operati:ns of the law 
enforcement agency. 
RULES,POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
1. Necessity for Written Directives. 
Operations of a police agency are so complex that a systematic pro-
cedure for issuing written directives must exist. Directives serve as 
a foundation for effective discipline. Any analysis of disciplinary 
procedures must start with an intensive concentration on written directives. 
Directives extablish the-level of expected behavior and should be un-
dated and current. 
2. Policies Must be Clearly Stated and Understood by A l l . 
A. Policies and procedures should be "concise and supervisors should 
develop-a-system-to- assure that everyone affected by an order 
receives a copy. 
B. Supervisors should encourage a l l employees to give r.put into the 
administrative process cf establishing directives. 
C. Supervisors should use standardized format to avoid Gifficulty in 
determining which directives are most authoritative. 
3 Directives Must be Legal 
A. Directives"cannot be contrary to law or prevailing'tiencs" of the 
court. 
B. Directives must be periodically reviewed and ucdated to be current 
with latest court decisions^ 
k. Disciplinary Process—Written Reprimand 
A. Written Reprimand: V/hen a supervisor or ccrrmand level officer issues 
a verbal or written reprimand, he must f i rs t verbally explain the 
nature of the complaint to the accused member. 
B. Copies of the reprimand wi l l be distributed as follows: 
1) Accused officer. 
2) Accused officer's personnel file—department. 
3) Accused Officer's personnel f i le— division. 
A) Chief executive. 
reibunnei uiscipune rroceoures 
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A. Disciplinary Process-Written Reprimand (cont.) 
C. Warnings and informal actions prior to formal action being taken can 
be important in sustaining later formal-disciplinary actions, .-'any 
supervisors hamper the disciplinary process throucn ignorance of the 
need for, or laziness in submitting, documentation. 
RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY IN DISCIPLINARY FUNCTION 
1. Supervisors 
A. Supervisors shall have the authority to take the foilowing action . 
without prior authorization from heigher authority. 
1) Oral reprimand. 
2) Written reprimand. 
3) Temporary relief of duty with pay. 
a) Requires immediate notification of division commander. 
B. Supervisors may also initiate stronger action.by_sucmitting_written. 
reports of misconduct to a higher authority. 
2. Higher Authority. 
A. Any person having authority over 1st line supervisors may take tne 
following action: 
1) Oral Reprimand. 
2) Written reprimand. 
3) Temporary relief of duty with pay - Written report require:. 
A) Temporary relief of duty without pay- written report recuired. 
5) Suspension of a maximum of two days off without pay - written 
report required. 
a) This action shall follow an informal hearing within A3 h:urs 
in which the memoer is given an opportunity to answer tre 
allegations against him. The accuser is not to conduct the 
hearing but may present evidence to support his case. 
b) The member may appeal an adverse decision to the chief 
executive who will approve the^action, disapprove the action, 
or refer it for a hearing before'a Discipline Hearing Board, 
(DH3), if action involves mare than three days off without pay. 
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2. Higher Authority, (cont.) 
B. Higher supervisors may also initiate stronger action by submitting 
written reports of misconduct to the chief executive with requests 
for longer suspensions, demotion, or dismissal. Such actions will 
be reviewed by the DHB, at the employee's request. 
3. Internal Affairs Unit. 
A. Each department, however small, should have a formalized procedure 
to investigate any incident which may require a hearing. An Inter-
nal-Affairs Unit. In many instances in smaller departments, this 
may be the chief executive himself. 
B. The Internal Affairs Unit will, upon request of the chief executive, 
or any higher supervising authority, investigate any incident or 
incidents which appear to require such inquiry. 
A. The Chief Executive. 
A. The.Chief-executive may be the Sheriff, the Chief of Police, Director 
Constable, or Superintendent of any agency... 
1) The chief executive may take the following action: 
a) Oral reprimand. 
b) Written reprimand. 
c) temporary relief of duty with pay - written report required. 
d) Temporary relief of duty without pay - written report re-
quired. 
e) Suspension of a maximum of three days off without pay 
written report required. 
1. This action shall follow an informal hearing within 48 
hours in which the member is given an opportunity to 
answer the allegations against him. 
2. The member may appeal an adverse decision for a hearing 
before a Discipline Hearing board. 
f) Suspension, with or without payt up to a maximum of 30 days. 
1. Any action approved by trie.'chief executive for more than 
three days off without pay, shall automatically be heard 
by a Discipline Hearing Board. 
g) Dismiss the employee. 
1. Any action approved by the cnief executive, shall 
n 
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g) Dismiss the employee (cont.) 
automatically be heard by the Discipline Hearing Board. 
2) In minor disciplinary actions ordered by a supervisor or a higher 
authority, it is still ultimately the chief executive's authority, 
delegated by regulation, which results in "the disciplinary action. 
3) The chief executive will therefore be notified when such minor 
action is taken. The chief executive will then notify the Dis-
cipline Hearing Board( if necessary), or take whatever other action 
is needed as a result of, or to carry out, the discipline. 
5. Discipline Hearing Board (DHB) 
A. The DHB in small communities, may be chaired by a member of the 
city/county board of commissions, the mayor, etc. 
B. The DHB will be responsible for hearing all cases directed to it by 
the chief.executive__£rIraary_responsibilities of the DHB include: 
1) Hearing disciplinary cases which may result in dismissal, de-
motion, or suspension of more..than three days off without pay. 
2) The DHB reviews will take one of the following actions. 
a) Reject the member's appeal. 
b) Remand the case back to the original hearing board for 
rehearing. 
c) In serious cases the DHB may recommend that it hear the 
case in a de novo hearing. 
d) The DHB will make written findings and .recommendations as 
a result of hearing any cases set before it. The written 
reports of the DH3 will be submitted to the chief executive. 
Copies will also be distributed according to the provisions 
set forth in this chapter. 
6. Grounds for Discipline or Dismissal 
A. Provisions. 
1) A peace officer holding a permanent appointment may be demoted, 
reduced in pay, suspended, or discharged for: 
a) Neglect of duty; 
b) Disobedience of a reasonable order; 
c) Misconduct; 
d) Inefficiently or inability to satisfactorily perform assigned 
duties; 
e) Any act hostile to the public service. 
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B. Department Rules and Regulations 
1) Violations of the department's manuals, general orders, rnemor--
anda and other authorized written instructions, rules, regulations 
or policies are grounds for disciplinary action or dismissal. 
C. Acts or Oimissions Contrary to Gcod Order 
1) No arbitrary rules of conduct can be extablished which will 
embrace all cases arising in the general discharge of police 
duties or in the personal aciivities of the individual employee. 
Therefore, any other act or emission contrary to good order and 
discipline shall also be the subject of disciplinary action. 
D. Criminal Acts. 
1) Commission of violations of the laws, or ordinances of the United 
States of America, or the State of Utah, or any political sub-
division of the state, are grounds for disciplinary action or 
dismissal: 
2) The commission of a felony, a misdemeanor involving drug abuse 
or .moral turpitude,, or._gthe_r serious misdemeanor shall be justi-
fication for termination. 
DISCIPLINARY PROCESS MAJOR DISCIPLINE 
1. Initial Action 
A. Document Allegations. 
1) All information available shall be included in the report. 
2) The report shall be submitted to~the superior officer and/or 
the chief executive. 
3. Investigative Allegations. 
1) Depending on the seriousness and nature of tre allegations, the 
case will be investigated by the Internal Affairs Unit, or by 
another person specializing in the investigation of a specific 
crime if criminal conduct is alleged. 
2) Copies of all investigative reports will be made available to 
the chief executive and to the Discipline Hearing Board. 
C. Evaluate Results of the Investigation? 
1) If, after reviewing the results of the investigation, there 
appears to be substantial evicence to support the allegations 
against the member, action will be initialed to the DHB if the 
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7. Members shall not recom^nd or suggest to anyone the 
employment or name of any person, firm, or corporation, 
as attorney, counsel, or bondsman, except that nothing, 
herein shall be construed as restricting the rights of 
members of the departmei in connection with administration 
of their private affairs. 
1-18 Right to Strike 
Because the public health, safety and welfare may be adversely 
affected thereby, no employee shall have the right to engage 
in or encourage any form of sit-down, slow-down, or in fact 
any form of work stoppage c strike for any reason, against 
the community. A refusal by an employee to perform an assign-
ment injurious to his healn or physical safety shall not be 
considered a violation of nis section. 
1-19 Supervisor acauence Relatra to Misconduct of Members 
A superior officer "cannot ise several minor infractions of a 
subordinate as justificatizn for a major disciplinary action 
if no recorded action has :een taken in the past for the violaticn 
of the minor infractions. 
1-20 Grievance Procedure 
Any employee who expresses dissatisfaction outside of the 
department before attempting to use, or exhausting, the 
grievance model shall be sjbject to discipline. Any supervisor 
found discussing an employee's grievances with another supervisor 
who may be reviewing or his reviewed the employee's grievance 
shall be subject to discirlinary action. 
If any provison of these :rocedures and policies or the applicaiiGn 
thereof be found to be in conflict with any state or federal 
law, the conflicting partes hereby declared inoperative to 
the extent of the conflic, but shall not affect the operation 
of the remainder of these procedures and policies. 
ADDENDUM: 
Cited portions of Record on Appeal 
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Lee C. Henning, #4593 
David C. Richards, #6023 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P. C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 South West Temple-; Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah' 84101 
Telephone: (801) 3 55-34 31 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL D. DARBY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON TERRACE CITY, 
a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
JAN 0 4 1993 
AFFIDAVIT OF LT. RICHARD 
COPE 
Civil No. 920900158 
Judge David Roth 
) 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
The affiant after being duly sworn deposes and states that: 
1. I am the Lieutenant at the Washington Terrace Police 
Department. 
2. I worked closely with Officer Darby for a number of years 
and was his supervisor. 
3. The department began having serious problems with Officer 
Darby in the fall of 1990 involving his failure to report to work 
when scheduled, the unprofessional appearance of his person and 
squad car, and his general unwillingness or inability to perform 
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his responsibilities. 
4. On December 23, 1990 Officer Darby failed to show up for 
his shift as scheduled^and appeared only after repeated calls by 
other officers and myself and ultimately showed up for work 
approximately 5\ hours late. As the result of the incident of the 
23rd, Chief Tracy, Officer Darby and myself had a long meeting on 
December 24th in which Officer Darby admitted his various problems 
and blamed his problems on his personal life and suggested that he 
should receive a written reprimand for being late on the 23rd. 
Chief Tracy asked that I prepare a written report which I did on 
December 27th and submitted to Chief Tracy. 
5. A few days after our meeting, on December 30, 1990, 
Officer Darby again did not report for work when scheduled and had 
to be called by the dispatcher and other officers and ultimately 
showed up for work 1\ late. 
6. On December 30, 1990, I again wrote another written 
report to Chief Tracy regarding the most recent incident. 
7. In mid-June of 1991, I reassigned Officer Darby a traffic 
accident report and ordered him to complete it within the next 
thirty days. 
8. On July 19, 1991 the traffic accident report had still 
not been completed and I ordered him to complete the report 
immediately. 
9. On August 1, 1991, Officer Darby showed up late for a 
shooting board meeting. 
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10. On August 2, 1991, Officer Darby again showed up late for 
work, 45 minutes, 
11. On August' 7, 1991, Officer Darby did not show up for 
shooting qualification meet when he was required to do so. 
12. On August 10, 1991, Officer Darby took a 22 calibre rifle 
into evidence from a suspect alleging that he believed it was 
stolen, but failed to indicate this in his report and did not put 
the gun properly into evidence. A true and correct copy of Officer 
Darby's report is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
13. On August 10, 1991, Officer Darby seized a checkbook as 
evidence, but again failed to properly put the book into evidence 
and filled out an inaccurate report indicating that the checkbook 
was in evidence. A true and correct copy of that report is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
14. On August 13, 1991, I assigned the checkbook case to 
Officer Gathercoal for investigation and again ordered Officer 
Darby to place the checkbook into evidence so Officer Gathercoal 
could complete the investigation. 
15. On August 14, 1991, the owner of the 22 calibre rifle 
asked Officer Darby about the status of the rifle and Officer Darby 
said he had to run the rifle through the office of alcohol, tobacco 
and firearms and would get back with him. 
16. On August 16, 1991, I ordered Officer Darby to return the 
rifle to the owner immediately. 
17. On August 18, 1991, Officer Darby was 43 minutes late to 
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work. 
18. On August 19, 1991, I again ordered Officer Darby to put 
the checkbook into evidence. 
19. On August 20, 1991, I obtained an incomplete traffic 
accident report from Officer Darby, found the rifle behind the file 
cabinet in the detective's office, and found the checkbook turned 
in, but no proper evidence slip included. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
Lt. Richard Cope 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of 
1992. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
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Investigative divisions, units, persons notified-
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CODES: 
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ADDITIONAL PEOPLE INVOLVED 
V=victim, W=Witness, C = Complainant , F=Father , M=Mother , G=Guardian 
Name: WINGET, DAVID 
ACdr: 5258 S 2425 E 
C3Z: ROY, UT. 84067 
AKA: 
DOB: 11-11-56 Age: 
Sex: M Race: Eth, 
HP: 773-6054 WP: 
MO: 
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Article Manufacturer/Color Model#/Serial# Q u a n > i- a L. 
1 S TOOL 
Owner Code: C 
1 3 MISC 
Owner Code: c 
TOOL BOX/ASST'D TOOLS 
AMERICA FIRST 
BL CHECKBOOK 
UCR 
K 
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Total Stolen Property Value: 250.00 
"he Details are as follows: 
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JURGLARV REPORT. THIS OFFICER TALKED WITH THE COMPLAIANT WHO STATED THV 
"nE. UNKNOWN SUSPECTS HAD TAKEN A TOOL BOX WITH ASSORTED TOOLS AND HIS 
:HECKB00K. THE COMPLAINANT HAD NO SUSPECTS. THE CHECK BOOK WAS 
RECOVERED BY OGDEN CITY AND IS IN EVIDENCE. 
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Photos? N 
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Er.iercjency Contact and Phone no. 
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Hold Vehicle for 
Disp. of Vehicle 
Birthplace 
Residence Addr 
Residence City 
Occupation/Grade 
Employer/School 
Held ic-: 
3coCed:W C JAIL 
3505 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UT. 
ARRESTED 
Date: 08-10-91 
Time: 
BOOKE: 
;at:.: 08-1( 
"I me : 
. O ~ • w- O ' 
ADDITIONAL PEOPLE INVOLVED 
' - V i c t i m , W=Witness, O C o m p l a i n a n t , F=Father , M-iK ^er , OGuar a i a n 
>arr,e: AIKENS, THOMAS 
^dcr: 311 W 4725 S 
C32: WASH. TERRACE, UT 84405 
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Sex: M 
'riP : 
MO: 
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3T DAILY OF RIVERDALE. THE COMPLAINANT STATED THAT THE SUSPECT i :AD 
-iREATENED TO KILL. FAMILY MEMBERS, THE SUBJECT HAS MENTAL PROBLEMS. 
JSPECT WAS ARRES"TED AND BOOKED INTO WEBER COUNTY JAIL. 
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Lee C. Henning, #4593 
David C. Richards, #6023 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P. C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL D. DARBY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON TERRACE CITY, 
a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
JAN 0 4 1993 
AFFIDAVIT OF POLICE CHIEF 
GARY W. TRACY 
Civil No. 920900158 
Judge David Roth 
The affiant after being duly sworn deposes and states that: 
1. I am the Chief of Police of Washington Terrace City. 
2. Our department is a small department and I follow each 
officer's progress closely. 
3. Prior to December of 1990, the department began having 
serious problems with Officer Darby not showing up for work when 
scheduled, not maintaining a professional appearance, not 
maintaining his squad car appropriately, and in many other details 
of his responsibilities. 
4. On December 24, 1990 I learned that Officer Darby had not 
shown up for his shift on the 23rd and appeared only after repeated 
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calls by other officers and Lt. Cope. Officer Darby ultimately 
showed up for work approximately 5h hours late. On the 2 4th Lt. 
Cope, Officer Darby .and I met regarding his being late for work on 
the 23rd. This was a very detailed meeting in which we discussed 
Officer Darby's problems. I asked Officer Darby what he thought I 
should do about him and he suggested I give him a written 
reprimand. I asked Lt. Cope to prepare a written report regarding 
Officer Darby's being late for work, which was prepared on December 
27, 1990 and is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
5. A few days after our meeting, on December 30th, Officer 
Darby again did not show up for work when scheduled and had to be 
called by the dispatcher and other officers. He ultimately showed 
up for work 1^  late. 
6. Lt. Cope wrote another report regarding this tardiness, 
which is attached hereteo as Exhibit B. 
7. As a result of these two tardiness I wrote the warning 
dated December 31, 1990 and included the corrective action and job 
performance sheet, as well as Lt. Cope's two reports to me. See, 
attached Exhibit C. I evaluated the two letters of reprimand by 
Lt. Cope and reported to Officer Darby in my own letter that any 
further incidents of tardiness occurring within one year would 
result in his termination. 
8. Officer Darby continued to have various and sundry 
problems with his appearance and general job performance. On July 
14, 1991 I delivered to him a written reprimand dated July 9, 1991 
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attached as Exhibit D, regarding his failure to comply with the 
corrective action on job performance sheet which I had delivered to 
him on December 31£t of the previous year. In my written warning 
of July 14, 1991, I ordered Officer Darby to seek personal 
counseling within the next ten days to attempt to straighten out 
his life. 
9. Through July and August of 1991, Officer Darby continued 
to have problems including insubordination with his second level 
supervisor, Lt. Cope. These problems began mounting very quickly 
and I began preparing an additional report which required regular 
revision based on his continuing conduct. After reviewing the 
great number of problems Officer Darby had during July and August 
of 1991, I wrote the August 21, 1991 letter to Officer Darby, 
attached as Exhibit E, ordering him to answer the various charges 
of incompetence, ineptitude and insubordination made by other 
officers. 
10. Officer Darby responded to this report in a letter of 
August 28, 1991, attached as Exhibit F. 
11. On September 3, 1991, I wrote Darby a final letter in 
which I indicated that I would terminate him for the accumulation 
of these problems, especially the insubordination and the repeated 
tardiness to work. That letter is attached as Exhibit G. 
12. My termination decision was upheld by the review board in 
a standard hearing. 
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DATED this day of , 1992. 
1992. 
Chief Gary W. Tracy 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
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TO: CHIEF GARY TRACY 
FROM: LT. RICHARD.-COPE 
SUBJECT: FAILURE TO REPORT FOR SHIFT 
DATE: DECEMBER 27, 1990 
AT APPROXIMATELY 1410 HOURS ON 12-23-90 OFFICER DAVIS 
CONTACTED ME AT MY RESIDENCE. OFFICER DAVIS SAID SGT. DARBY DID 
NOT SHOW UP FOR HIS SHIFT. I ASKED OFFICER DAVIS IF HE TRIED TO 
CONTACT SGT. DARBY. OFFICER DAVIS SAID, YES. HE ALSO LEFT A 
MESSAGE FOR SGT. DARBY TO CONTACT HIM AT WORK. 
I DRESSED IN MY UNIFORM AND SIGNED ON WITH WEBER DISPATCH AT 
1427 HOURS. I THEN RESPONDED TO THE CITY OFFICE TO BRIEF WITH 
OFFICER DAVIS AND TIRED TO CONTACT SGT. DARBY. I ALSO LOOKED AT 
MY COPY OF THE SCHEDULE TO MAKE SURE SGT. DARBY WAS SUPPOSED TO 
WORK THE SHIFT ON 12-23-90 AT. 1400 HOURS. THE SCHEDULE SHOWS 
SGT. DARBY WORKING THE 1400 HOUR TO 2200 HOUR SHIFT. I THEN 
TRIED TO CONTACT SGT. DARBY AT HIS PLACE OF RESIDENCE. I ALSO 
LEFT A MESSAGE TO HAVE HIM CALL BACK TO THE DISPATCH FOR THE 
MESSAGE. 
AT 1930 HOURS SGT. DARBY SIGNED ON WITH WEBER DISPATCH. I 
MET SGT. DARBY AT THE CITY OFFICE AND ASKED HIM WHY HE DID NOT 
REPORT FOR HIS SHIFT. SGT. DARBY SAID HE FORGOT TO LOOK AT THE 
SHIFT SCHEDULE. I TOLD SGT. DARBY IF WE WERE NOT SO SHORT ON 
PERSONNEL, I WOULD SEND KIM HOME WITH PAY UNTIL I COULD DO 
SOMETHING ABOUT THE PROBLEM. 
I FEEL THAT SGT. DARBY SHOULD RECEIVE: 1. THREE DAYS OFF 
WITHOUT PAY AND 2. A LETTER OF REPRIMAND BE PLACED IN HIS 
PERSONNEL FILE. I BELIEVE AS A SUPERVISOR OF THE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT SGT. DAR3Y SHOULD SET AN EXAMPLE BY WORKING HIS SHIFT 
ON TIME, HAVING HIS UNIFORM IN GOOD ORDER AND HIS VEHICLE CLEAN. 
I ALSO BELIEVE SGT. DARBY HAS A HIGHER DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
TO THE POLICE DEPARTMENT AS A WHOLE AND TO THE-OFFICERS THAT WORK 
UNDER HIS DIRECTION. 
LT. RICHARD COPE 052 
TO: CHIEF GARY W. TRACY 
FROM: LT. RICHARD COPE 
SUBJECT: FAILURE TO^REPORT FOR SHIFT, FAILURE TO TURN IN LOG AND 
REPORTS / 
DATE: 12-30-90 
AT APPROXIMATELY 0610 HRS, 12-30-90, OFFICER HACKWORTH 
CONTACTED ME BY PHONE AT MY RESIDENCE, HE STATED HE TRIED TO 
CONTACT SGT. DARBY AT HIS RESIDENCE, AND TRIED HIS PAGER, WITH NO 
ANSWER ON THE PAGER. THE PERSON WHO ANSWERED THE PHONE STATED 
SGT. DARBY WAS NOT THERE AT THIS TIME. 
I TOLD OFFICER HACKWORTH, TO STAY OUT UNTIL I COULD GET 
READY FOR WORK. I DRESS, AND CALLED OFFICER HACKWORTH AT 0645 
HRS TO PICK ME UP. I THEN DROVE TO THE OFFICE TO BRIEF WITH 
OFFICER HACKWORTH, AND TO CHECK THE SCHEDULE TO SEE IF SGT. DARBY 
WAS THE DAY CAR ON THE 30TH OF DECEMBER. (THE REVISED 
SCHEDULE).IT SHOWS SGT. DARBY WORKING DAY SHIFT. I THEN TRIED 
SGT. DARBY'S PAGER NUMBER AGAIN.- I THEN GOT IN MY PATROL CAR AND 
DROVE TO OGDEN, SGT. DARBY'S ADDRESS 81 HEALY AVE. THE PATROL 
CAR WAS PARKING IN THE DRIVEWAY. I THEN RETURNED TO THE CITY 
OFFICE TO OBTAIN SGT. DARBY'S OLD PHONE NUMBER. AT 0730 HRS I 
CALLED SGT. DARBY. SGT. DARBY ANSWERED THE PHONE, I INFORMED HIM 
THAT HE WAS SUPPOSE TO BE WORKING THE DAY SHIFT, HE STATED HE 
CHECKED, THE SCHEDULE, HE WAS NIGHT SHIFT. I TOLD SGT. DARBY I 
WOULD CHECK AGAIN. I AGAIN- CHECKED THE SCHEDULE IT IN FACT 
SHOWS, SGT. DARBY WORKING THE DAY SHIFT. SGT. DARBY STATED HE 
WOULD BE RIGHT OUT. 
WHEN SGT. DARBY SIGNED ON I TOLD HIM TO MEET ME AT HILL TOP, 
SO I COULD TALK TO HIM. SGT. DARBY AND I, MET AT HILL TOP. I 
AGAIN TOLD HIM IF I WAS NOT SHORT ON PERSONNEL I WOULD SEND HIM 
HOME. HE STATED HE LOOKED AT THE SCHEDULE, HE WAS NOT WORKING A 
SHIFT ON SUNDAY. I ASKED HIM WHAT SCHEDULE DID HE LOOK AT. IT 
MUST NOT HAVE BEEN THE REVISED SCHEDULE. THE SCHEDULE SGT. DARBY 
MADE UP FOR THE REST OF DECEMBER. 
I TOLD SGT. DARBY TO BE IN MY-OFFICE 8.00 AM 12-31-90. WHEN 
I ARRIVED AT THE CITY OFFICE ON 12-31-90 TO CHECK REPORTS, AND 
LOGS, SGT. DARBY'S LOGS AND REPORTS WERE NOT IN. THIS IS NOT THE 
FIRST TIME, SGT. DARBY HAS BEEN WARNED ABOUT HIS LOGS AND REPORTS 
PRIOR TO THIS DATE. 
I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT SGT. DARBY BE DEMOTED FOR 
INEFFICIENTLY AND INABILITY TO SATISFACTORILY PERFORM ASSIGNED 
DUTIES. THIS IS THE SECOND TIME WITHIN A WEEK PERIOD OF TIME 
ALSO THE WARNING IN THE PAST. 
SGT. DARBY SHOULD RECEIVED A 1) LETTER OR REPRIMAND FOR 
FAILURE TO SHOW FOR HIS SHIFT, 2) 3 DAYS OFF WITHOUT PAY, AND BE 
PLACED ON PROBATION FOR A YEAR PERIOD OF TIME. 
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TO: MICHAEL DARBY 
FROM: GARY W. TRACY, CHIEF OF POLICE 
SUBJECT: DEMOTION, PAY REDUCTION, AND 2 LETTERS OF WRITTEN REPRIMAND. 
DATE: 12-31-90 
Mike, as per our meeting on 12-31-90, it is my decision, that you be removed 
from the position of Sergeant, and you will be reduced in pay accordingly, 
to your prior place as Police Officer III, Grade 10 Step 22, and 2 letters 
of written reprimand. 
In making my decision, I looked at the two letters, from Lt. Cope on your 
failure to report for two shifts, 12-23-90, and 12-30-90, as you recall the 
Lt. , you and I had a meeting on Thursday the 24th on this very situation. At 
this time you stated you were going to get yourself straightened out. I felt 
very good about this, but then you don't show up for a shift. 
As per our meeting on 12-31-90, I understand what you meant by you cannot 
be expected to be a Sergeant, cover shifts, and be called out all hours of 
the day and night. I was in the process of trying to change this. 
I hope you will take this demotion as a positive experience, and will 
leam from it. If any further incidents of failure, to report for a shift 
occur within one year you will be terminated. 
This letter will remain in your file for one year or 12-31-91. 
You may appeal my decision to the City Administrator as per city policy. 
Gary W. Tracy ^ 
Chief of Police 
I have received a copy of this letter and two letters from Lt. Cope 
M\V\\{ J$\Xs Date l l - ? | - < ? a 
Michael Darby 
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TOs MICHAEL DARBY 
FROM: GARY W. TRACY, CHIEF OF POLICE 
SUBJECT: CORRECTIVE ACTION ON JOB PERFORMANCE. 
1. You seek personal counseling through employee assistance program, this 
is voluntary at this point, failure to seek personal counseling will 
make it mandatory. 
2. Professional Appearance. 
1. Uniform will be cleaned and pressed, foot wear needs attention as 
to worn our and polished. 
2. When you report for work you will be clean shaven. 
3. When in a police vehicle you will be dressed in proper attire, 
as per Police Dept. Rules and Regulations. 
3. Vehicle. 
1. Your vehicle will be kept clean. 
A. This is in reference to the interior. 
4. Instructions. 
1. All reports will be turned in, in complience with Police Dept. 
Rules and Regulations. 
2. Tasks assigned will be carried out in a timely manner and turned 
in when due. 
These requests will be followed up on by Lt. Cope and a monthly report 
submitted to me. Failure to comply with these requests will be delt with 
according to Police Dept. Rules and Regulations. 
Gary W. Tracy 
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TO: MICHAEL DARBY 
FROM: CHIEF GARY W TRACY 
DATE: JULY 9, 1991 
SUBJECT: FAILURE TO FOLLOW RECOMMENDATIONS. 
DEAR MIKE: 
AS PER THE LETTER GIVEN TO YOU ON YOUR JOB PERFORMANCE WHEN 
YOU WERE REMOVED FROM THE SERGEANTS POSITION. 
1. PROFESSIONAL APPEARANCE. 
A. UNIFORM WILL BE CLEAN AND PRESS, FOOTWEAR. 
1. THIS HAS BEEN AND STILL IS A PROBLEM. 
B. WHEN IN A POLICE VEHICLE YOU WILL BE IN PROPER ATTIRE. 
1. THIS HAS BEEN AND IS STILL A PROBLEM. 
A. WHEN YOU WENT TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE ON 
YOUR HIGH SPEED CASE, YOUR APPEARANCE WAS LESS_THAN 
DESIRABLE, CLOTHES WERE NOT CLEAN, NO SOCKS ON. 
2. VEHICLE. 
VEHICLE WILL BE KEPT CLEAN, THE INTERIOR WAS A MESS WHEN 
I PLACED A LETTER TO YOU FROM TOUGH LOVE. 
3. SEEK COUNSELING THROUGH EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. 
A. YOU WENT TWICE, SINCE THEN I HAVE ASKED YOU ON AT LEAST 
TOO OCCASIONS, IF YOU HAD GONE BACK, YOU STATED-"NOM 
BUT I WILL, YOU STILL HAVE NOT DONE THIS. 
AS THIS LETTER INDICATES YOU HAVE NOT CARRIED OUT THOSE 
ITEMS THAT YOU WERE ASKED TO DO. I HAVE CALLED EMPLOYEE-'S 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM-WITH-MY. CONCERNS AS TO YOUR JOB PERFORMANCE. 
IT IS NOW MANDATORY THAT YOU SEEK SOME HELP. YOU HAVE 10 DAYS 
FROM-RECEIPT OF THIS LETTER TO SEEK HELP IF NOT I WILL TAKE 
ACTION THAT I DEEM NECESSARY TO CORRECT YOUR JOB PERFORMANCE. 
GARY W. TRACY 
CHIEF OF POLICE 
» H^WxJl 
MICHAEL DARBY DATE 
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TO: OFFICER MICHAEL DARBY 
FROM: CHIEF GARY W. TRACY 
SUBJECT: FAILURE TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION ON YOUR JOB PERFORMANCE 
DATE: AUGUST 21, 1*991 
I WILL EXPECT A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THE FOLLOWING ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST 
YOU IN FIVE (5) WORKING DAYS OR ON 8-29-91 BY 5:00 P.M. I HAVE INCLUDED A COPY 
OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION THAT YOU SIGNED ON WHAT YOU NEEDED TO DO. I HAVE ALSO 
INCLUDED THE LETTER YOU RECEIVED WHEN YOU WERE DEMOTED FROM THE SERGEANT'S 
POSITION. 
1. ON 8-2-91 YOU WERE THE 0600 TO 1500-CAR.—YOU MADE A CALL TO WEBER 
COUNTY 911 DISPATCH AT AROUND 0400 HOURS AND REQUESTED A WAKE-UP CALL AT 0500 
HOURS. THE DISPATCH CALLED AND WOKE YOU UP BUT YOU'FAILED TO SIGN ON UNTIL 
APPROXIMATELY 0645 HOURS. YOU WERE TO RELIEVE THE GRAVEYARD CAR AT 0600 HOURS. 
LT. COPE WAS CALLED BY THE GRAVEYARD CAR AND LT. COPE CAME TO THE OFFICE. SGT. 
RHODES SPOKE WITH LT. COPE AND HE SAID THAT THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN TAKEN CARE OF. 
2. ON 8-11-91 YOU WERE AGAIN THE 0600 TO 1500 CAR AND FAILED TO SHOW FOR 
WORK UNTIL ABOUT 0610 HOURS. THE GRAVEYARD CAR HAD THE DESPATCH CALL YOU BUT YCU 
SIGNED ON AS THEY WERE CALLING. 
3. ON 8-1-91 YOU CALLED A SHOOTING REVIEW BOARD AS YOU ARE THE CITY ARMOR. 
THE BOARD CONSISTED OF SGT. RHODES-AND OFFICER SATTERTHWAITE. OFFICER WINBERG 
WAS THE OFFENDING OFFICER. THE BOARD WAS TO CONVENE AT 1300 HOURS ON 8-1-91. 
THE"NIGHT"PRIOR TO THE REVIEW BOARD HEARING YOU CALLED SGT. RHODES AT HIS HOME 
AT 9:50 P.M. AND ASKED IF YOU COULD GO HCME AT 10:00 P.M. , AN HOUR EARLY, BECAUSE 
YOU WANTED THE BOARD TO MEET AT 12:00 P.M. TO REVIEW THE CASE. SGT. RHODES TOLD 
YOU THAT IT WAS OKAY FOR YOU TO GO HCME EARLY. THE DAY OF THE REVIEW BOARD 
OFFICER SATTERTHWAITE AND SGT. RHODES WERE AT THE OFFICE AT 12:00 P.M. BUT YOU 
DIDN'T SHOW. AT 1:00 P.M., THE SCHEDULED TIME OF THE HEARING, YCU HAD STILL NOT 
ARRIVED. THE HEARING BEGAN AT 1:00 P.M. OFFICER SATTERTHWAITE AND SGT. RHODES 
CONDUCTED THE HEARING WITHOUT YCU. JUST AS THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDING AT 1:12 
P.M. YCU ARRIVED. THEY THEN HAD TO COMPLETELY START OVER. AT THE CONCLUSION OF 
THE HEARING THE BOARD DISCUSSED THEIR FINDINGS. YOU INSISTED THAT YOU WRITE THE 
LETTER TO THE ME AND OFFICER WINBERG. SGT. RHODES EXPLAINED TO OFFICER WINBERG 
THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE THEIR DECISION WITHIN 24 HOURS. YOU TOOK THE REPORTS AND 
SGT. RHODES' CITY POLICY MANUAL TO KELP WITH WRITING THE LETTER. AS OF 8-13-91 
NO LETTER HAS EVEN BEEN WRITTEN BY YOU. SGT. RHODES SPOKE WITH YOU ABOUT GOING 
HOME EARLY THE NIGHT BEFORE BUT YOU STATED THAT YOU DID NOT LEAVE UNTIL YOUR 
SHIFT WAS OVER. ON 8-6-91 SGT. RHODES WROTE T~Z LETTER AND TURNED IT IN TO ME 
AND OFFICER WINBERG. 
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"^  4. ON 8-8-91 SGT. RHODES WAS NOTIFIED BY CITY ATTORNEY ROBERT NEELEY THAT 
YOU FAILED TO SHOW FOR A SCHEDULED COURT TRIAL IN CITY COURT. SGT. RHODES 
CONTACTED NINA COLEMAN AND HE WAS ADVISED THAT YOU DID NOT PICK U? YOUR 
SUBPOENAS. NINA STATED .THAT SHE PLACED THE SUBPOENA NOTIFICATION LIST ON THE 
PATROL ROOM DOOR WITH YOUR NAME ON IT, LETTING YOU KNOW THAT THERE WERE SUBPOENAS 
THAT NEEDED TO BE PICKED UP. NINA STATED THAT THE SU3P0ENAS WERE READY TO BE 
PICKED UP ON 7-15-91 AND THAT SHE PERSONALLY TOLD YOU AT LEAST 2 TIMES THAT THEY 
WERE THERE AND YOU FAILED TO PICK THEM UP. SGT. RHODES SPOKE WITH JUDGE JOHN 
SANDBERG AND HE TOLD HIM THAT HE PERSONALLY ADVISED YOU ON 8-5-91 IN COURT OF THE 
UPCOMING TRIAL AND THE IMPORTANCE OF YOUR APPEARANCE AND YOU STILL DID NOT PICK 
UP YOUR SUBPOENAS AND FAILED TO SHOW IN COURT. "THE CASE WAS DISMISSED." " A 
LETTER FROM JUDGE SANDBERG IS ATTACHED." THE LETTER FROM JUDGE SANDBERG 
INDICATED THAT YOU MISSED COURT ON 8-8-91, ON 2-2-91 AND ALSO ON 3-7-91, THREE 
TIMES IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS. 
^ -5, AT THE END OF -THE MONTH EACH OFFICER IS REQUIRED TO TURN IN A VEHICLE 
MAINTENANCE LOG AND ALL OF THE MONTH'S GAS RECEIPTS. ON 8-2-91 SGT. RHODES 
NOTIFIED YOU, IN PERSON, AND ADVISED YOU THAT HE NEEDED YOUR GAS SLIPS AND LOG. 
YOU SAID YOU WOULD GET THEM IMMEDIATELY. ON 8-8-91 SGT. RHODES AGAIN ADVISED YOU 
AND AGAIN ON 8-9-91. AS OF 8-13-91, SGT. RHODES STILL DOES NOT HAVE YOUR LOGS 
OR GAS RECEIPTS; THEREFORE, SGT. RHODES HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO TURN IN THE MONTHLY 
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE REPORT AS HE IS REQUIRED TO DO. 
6. ON 8-7-91 ALL DEPARTMENT POLICE OFFICERS WERE REQUIRED TO ATTEND A 
MANDATORY SHOOTING QUALIFI CAT ICN. YOU WERE SCHEDULED TO SHOOT AT 10:00 A.M. AND 
FAILED TO SHOW AT THE PROPER TIME. YOU HAD ALSO MADE PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS TO 
ASSIST OFFICER WINBERG IN PFEPMl¥G~THE~SHOOTING RANGE AT 0730 HOURS ON THE DAY 
OF THE SHOOT. YOU FAILED TO SHOW. JUST PRIOR TO THE 2:00 P.M. SHOOTING SCHEDULE 
THE POLICE SECRETARY CALLED YOU AT YOUR HOME AND YOU SHOWED UP FOR THE 2:00 P.M. 
SHOOTING. 
" 7. A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FORM, CASE 910765, THAT YOU HANDLED WAS RE-ASSIGNED 
TO YOU TO FINISH BY 7-19-91. AS OF 8-20-91 THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FORM STILL HAS 
NOT BEEN COMPLETED AND TURNED IN. THIS IS (30) THIRTY DAYS PAST THE DUE DATE. 
WHY HAS THIS NOT BEEN COMPLETED? 
y
 8. REPORTS AND LOGS HAVE NOT BEEN TURNED IN AT THE END OF YOUR SHIFTS. 
WHEN LOGS AND REPORT ARE TURNED IN, SEVERAL ITEMS HAVE BEEN LEFT OFF 30TH THE 
LOGS AND REPORTS. WHY? 
/ 9. ON 8-19-91 YOU WERE SUPPOSED TO APPEAR IN RIVERDALE COURT AT 3:00 P.M. 
BY A LEGAL SUBPOENA BUT YOU FAILED TO APPEAR. WHY? 
y
 10. LT. COPE HAS SPOKEN TO YOU ABOUT A CHECK3COK THAT YOU HAVE THAT WAS 
SUPPOSED TO EE PUT INTO EVIDENCE. IT HAS NOT BEEN FJT INTO EVIDENCE AS OF THIS 
DATE, 8-20-91. YOUR REPORT CASE S9II058 STATES THAT THE CHECKBOOK IS IN 
EVIDENCE. 
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11. ON 8-10-91 YOU WERE CALLED ON A CIVIL DISTURBANCE AT THE AIKENS 
RESIDENCE AT 311 W. 4775 S. YOU TOOK A SEMIAUTOMATIC 22 CAL RIFLE FROM THE 
RESIDENCE. THIS RIFLE WAS NOT USED IN A CRIME AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE 
CALL EXCEPT THAT IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE STOLEN. 
A. WHY DID YOU TAKE THE RIFLE? 
3. WHY IS THERE NO REPORT ON THIS RIFLE? 
C. WHY WAS THERE NOT A RECEIPT GIVEN TO MR. AIKENS FOR THE RIFLE? 
D. WHY WAS THE RIFLE PLACED INTO EVIDENCE WITH NO EVIDENCE TAG? 
E. WHY DID YOU REMOVE THE RIFLE FROM THE EVIDENCE LOCKER? 
F. GN 8-14-91 MR. AIKENS STOPPED YOU AND ASKED, "WHAT ARE YOU DOING 
ABOUT THE RIFLE." YOU SUPPOSEDLY TOLD MR. AIKENS THAT YOU 
WOULD GET BACK WITH HIM. YOU HAVE NOT DONE THIS. 
G. YOU WERE TOLD BY LT. COPE TO RETURN THE RIFLE TO MR. AIKENS ON 
8-16-91. WHY WAS THIS NOT DONE? 
H. THE LIEUTENANT FOUND THE RIFLE IN QUESTION STILL IN THE 
DETECTIVE'S OFFICE ON 8-20-91. 
(H) ON 7-14-91 YOU RECEIVED A LETTER FROM ME THAT YOUR JOB PERFORMANCE WAS 
NOT SATISFACTORY. (LETTER ATTACHEDT-)—I-TALKED WITH SARAH PHILLIPS AT EMPLOYEE 
ASSISTANCE AND SHE STATED THAT YOU DID NOT SHOW UP FOR YOUR LAST APPOINTMENT. 
WHY? 
13. ON 8-18-91 YOU WERE THE 0600 TO 1500 CAR. YOU WERE TO RELIEVE OFFICER 
HACKWORTH AT 0600 HOURS AND AT 0640 HOURS OFFICER KACKWORTH RECEIVED AL CALL FROM 
THE DISPATCHER TO CALL YOU AT YOUR HOME, THEN AT APPROXIMATELY 0643 HOURS YOU DID 
SIGN ON. 
RECEIVED A COPY: A 
MICHAEL D. DAR3Y O GARY W. TRACY; CHIEF OF POtfiCE 
DATE:_8_l?Il£J DATE:AUGUST 21, 1991 
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TO: CHIEF GARY W. TRACY 
FROM: OFFICER MICHAEL DARBY 
SUBJECT: REPLY TO LETTER OF AUGUST 21, 1991 ON MY JOB 
PERFORMANCE 
DATE: AUGUST 28, 19 91 
The following is the written response requested by you on 
August 28, 1991 concerning my job performance: 
1. On 8-2-91 I was 45 minutes late for the day shift. 
2. On- 8-11-91 I was not late for the day shift, unless 
there was a difference in the time given by my watch, and the 
time given by dispatch. 
3. In reference to your written statement that the meeting 
was to be convened at 1200 hours on 8-1-91: It was ray 
understanding that this was an invitation to go for coffee before 
the formal meeting, which made it optional* At no time did I 
-request--a—meeting-to—be-convened at 1200 hours. The shooting 
board was to be convened at 1300 hours. I was late by a few 
minutes due to traffic. _Upon ray arrival at the city office I 
obtained my materials. • I_was told.that, .the board members had 
already gone to the counsel room. When I walked into the room it 
did not appear that the_meeting was over, since Officer Winberg 
was relating the incidence that led to the canine attack against 
his person. After Officer Winberg had finished, Sgt. Rhodes, 
Officer Satterthwaite and I then asked Officer Winberg questions 
about the incident, after which the board meeting was concluded. 
I was to write a letter to the Chief Within 24 hours concerning 
the incident because I was on the board; however, I found there 
was pertinent information pertaining to this incident that 
needed to be acquired. Section 16-15 Firearms Review panel does 
not automatically call for a 24 hour conclusion. Review Process 
16-17 paragraph three (3) allows a board member to investigate 
further information. While talking to the animal control officer 
about the reports coming from the veterinarian a person 
approached me asking about the dog that had been shot. She stated 
that the dog had lived in her area and that she has had problems 
with the dog in question. I requested a written statement from 
this person. I informed Sgt. Rhodes of this new information. I 
waited two days for this person to return her statement and then 
started trying to contact her at her residence. When I finally 
was able to get a hold of her she told me that it was not the 
same dog. By this time I had heard the letter was taken care of. 
4. On 8-8-91 when I arrived at the city office, I found 
that I had missed a court date. I recall talking with Judge 
1 - 1
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mentioned, it was not my intention to miss this trial. As for 
the dates 2-2-91 and 3-7-91 missing these trail dates are new to 
me, and I have., no recall of it ever being mentioned prior to 
this letter, of eVer seeing them on the subpoena notification 
list, and to the best of my knowledge I don't remember ever 
getting a subpoena. When Sgt. Rhodes arrived at the city 
office the day in question "8-8-91" I advised him that I did not 
go to court. 
5. I did not turn in the milage log. I did advise Sgt. 
Rhodes that I had lost gas slips and log for the first part of 
the month. 
6. On 8-7-91 I did miss the first shoot thatday by over-
sleeping on my day off. When I was notified by" "the'dispatcher I 
responded for the second shoot. As for Officer Winberg's claim 
that I made arrangements to assist, I did. I told Officer Winberg 
that if he wanted assistance to set up the equipment, for him to 
give me a call that morning. I did not receive a telephone call. 
At the range I asked Winberg why he didn't call and he stated "I 
don't call anybody." If Officer Winberg had called he would have 
received the assistance he claimed I promised. 
7. Traffic Accident Case 91-0765: This case was reported 
as-a-stolen vehicle, hit and run. During the investigation I 
found that this was not a stolen vehicle, hit and run, but that 
the"complainant had loaned his fathers truck to a friend who-had 
hit_the garage.„.After receiving the initial information, I told 
the complainant to have his parents contact me. I did advise Lt. 
Cope about this case. Upon receiving this case I tried to make 
contact with the father of the complainant. I put the case in my 
box and tried several times unsuccessfully to make contact 
with.the father of the complainant, who was the owner of the 
property. On 8-22-9L, I tried again to make contact. Having no 
contact with the owner I advised Lt. Cope again and the case is 
to be closed. 
8. I will agree that my reports and logs have not been 
turned in at the end of the shift. But this has occurred not 
only with myself but with other department members. If this is a 
rule that is to be enforced, then it should be enforced on a 
timely and consistent basis. 
9.. On 8-19-91 I did miss this court date. I left my 
subpoena attached to the box in the patrol room and forgot about 
the court date. 
10. At the time I started working the follow-up on this 
(Auto Burglary) case I advised Lt. Cope and Det. Gathercole that 
I had information on this case that I needed the checkbook so I 
could follow up on a suspect. This case is an auto burglary that 
occurred at ST BENS. HOSPITAL; the checkbook was recovered in a 
stolen vehicle in Ogden City. After talking with a suspect that 
was forging checks out of the stolen checkbook and also more 
information on who the auto burglars are. I needed the checkbook 
to show one suspect, to put pressure on have him so he would turn 
the ones that actually committed the auto burglary at St Bens. I 
shared information with Det. Gathercole. I also keep Lt. Cope 
informed. As for the initial report"the following words should 
have been added and it should read: the checkbook is in evidence 
with the case. As for the supplemental report I have always 
taken information on the contacts I have made, compiled all this 
information and it is then placed categorically on the 
supplementary report. When the results to the case are all in 
then all items used to obtain information are secured in the 
evidence locker to await trial. This is the way I worked while 
in detectives without complaints. 
11. On 8-10-91, I was dispatched to 4300 S. 300 E. on a 
threats complaint. The suspect Russell-Aikens was gone from that 
residence when I arrived and was subsequently arrested on 
Riverdale Rd. At the time of the arrest, Russell made claims that 
his brother Tom was in possession of a stolen weapon. I then 
went to the residence at 311 W. 4775 S. where Tom Aikens 
resided. Tom told me that he had received a .22 caliber rifle 
from Russell and that if it was stolen he did not know about it. 
While at the residence I tried to run checks on the rifle through 
Weber County Dispatch, but—t^e-corapu-te^^s-wer-e-down^-
A. I told-Mr. Aikens-that the rifle, would be taken to 
the city office so I could run a check through Alcohol._Tobacco 
and Firearms (ATF.). I had probable cause to believe that it was 
stolen and might disappear if not secured. , . 
B. A report was started, but I had not obtained 
information off of the rifle. I placed the rifle into the 
evidence locker so I would not have it in my vehicle when I was 
dispatched to another call. When I returned I found the evidence 
locker locked and could not obtain the information for the 
report. 
C. I Went to give Mr. Aikens a receipt but did not 
have a receipt book. Mr. Aikens stated that he didn't need one 
as he knew who had the rifle. 
D. Upon returning to the office with the rifle, I 
began to do reports, but was immediately called out. Because I 
did not wish to carry the rifle with me, I hurriedly placed it in 
the evidence locker without a tag. Later I returned to the 
office to tag the rifle and finish reports only to find that the 
evidence locker was locked (the only key being in the possession 
of Det. Gathercole, and she was not available). On the 12 and 13 
of August I was on my days off.On the 14 and 15th I was unable to 
obtain- the rifle out of the evidence locker. 
E. On the 16 of August I obtained the rifle from the 
evidence locker and ran all the checks I could through ATF and 
NCIC to see if the rifle was stolen. I requested the name of the 
person who first purchased the rifle threw ATF. 
F. On 8-15-91 I did talk to Mr. Aikens about his 
« -~^ ..u^  U-,A u,^^ :*rr^c^o^ * n r\ u h ^ fhp ronrt had order^d^^ I 
told Mr. Aikens that I still had to do the checks on the rifle. 
G. The day I obtained the rifle from the evidence 
locker (August 16r 19-91) and ran the checks Lt. Cope said to take 
the rifle bajck. I went by Mr. Aikens residence but found that 
nobody was home. 
H. On 8-16-91 Lt. Cope and I had a discussion about 
the rifle. Lt. Cope refused to hear my rationale concerning the 
rifle and wanted it returned. 
Since I had not been able to return the rifle on 8-16-91 I 
left the rifle in the detective Gathercoles office instead of 
carrying it in my vehicle, and since detective Gathercole was 
off August 17, 18, 1991, and I was off on August 19, 20, 21, 
1991, I did not get the rifle returned. The rifle was later 
placed into evidence by the lieutenant. 
12. On 7-14-91 I received your letter. We discussed the 
contents of this letter. On 7-15-91 I went to Sarah Phillips's, 
office (Ms. Phillips of the Employee Assistance Program) and 
talked with her. Another meeting was to be set since she was 
going to be on vacation. Ms. Phillips called me to set a date 
for a meeting. Not having a schedule at hand we set the meeting. 
On the day of the meeting I was working the afternoon shift alone 
and was tied up on a call which meant that I was then unable to 
attend the meeting. 
13. 8-18-91; I was late that morning. 
^JU^ 
TO: MICHAEL DARBY 
FROM: GARY W. TRACY.. CHIEF-OF POLICE 
ITEM 1: YOU ADMIT YOU WERE 45 MINUTESFl^E^^WC^-^N' 3-2-
91 ( LETTER DATED 12-31-9© SIGNED BY'^OU^T&£EIfe^££iLURE TO 
REPORT FOR SHIFT ASSIGNED WITHIN ONE^EAl£-%^tf^^UtD 3E 
TERMINATED.) FOR THIS VIOLATION-1 • AM. IMPOSJJHG-.c-jJEH^ EOLJiQJtflNG 3 
DAYS WITHOUT PAY AND A LETTER. OF.-WRITTEN REPEiMANIl 
ITEM 2: YOU STATE THAT YOU - WERE NOT>LAJB^FOR^iftY^SHIFT AS 
PER YOUR WATCH AND DISPATCH-.'. TIME""THAT^QU~S&!gM^M?^' :"WILL 
ACCEPT THIS. 
TTEM 3: YOU STATED THAT-YOU-DID NCT:.^EjiT^^MEETXfeFOR. THE 
BOARD TO MEET AT 12.00 PM, BUT THIS '.'.WAS ' T!£^'^F£EreOFFEE' BEFORE 
THE FORMAL MEETING. IT WAS THE. UNDERSTANDING^QE-TSGT;V-RHODES, AND 
OFFICER SATTERTHWAITE, THAT" ALL OF YOU WERE,TQ--;MEETIAT'. 125 00 PM 
TO DISCUSS THE CASE BEFORE"THE"FORMAL HEAEING^^%.^AC£'THE-NIGHT 
BEFORE THE MEETING YOU CALLED SGTv-RHODES^mTi^l^SSrHRS: ~AND ASK 
IF YOU COULD GO HOME AN HOUR EARLY. BECAUSE^-'WCHAVEVTO'MEET AT 
12.00 PM, SGT. RHODES OK'D THIS,- THE-'NEXTJ^A^SG&LL.RHODES' 'STATED 
TO YOU, YOU ARE LATE FOR THE MEETING,,-- PLgS^Y^/^E^T,..HQME,-AN HOUR 
EARLY SO THAT WE COULD MEET AT 12.00 -PM.A^4^-STATEI): YOtJ-^ DID NOT 
GO HOME AN HOUR—EARLY^) .-^-^OU~CAWE^NT^t-^E^MEETiNG AT 
APPROXIMATELY 13.12 HRS. THE BOARD''HAD jD'St^^OUT-^FIBISHED WITH 
THE-MEETING.--AND-- HAD TOGO-OVER^EVKRY^til^^^^^^M^'-TtiA'i: TIME 
SGT. RHODES STATED TO OFFICER. WINBERG T H A ^ ^ i ^ I ^ ^ P L Y - W O U L D 
BE GIVEN TO THE CHIEF AND OFFICER- WINBERG.4c£MiN-£TWENTY. FOUR 
HOURS. THE POLICY DOES NOT - STATE THATCH-IS - :.Hu"3T -OCCUR WITHIN 
TWENTY FOUR, BUT AT LEAST TWO' BOARD- MEWBER^^R^EDSrHAT^NO POLICY 
VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED, IN FACT SGT. RHODES?-STATED'"THAT HE WOULD 
WRITE THE RESPONSE OR THAT SATTERTHWAITE---SHOULD^DQs-?THIS AS HE IS 
THE APPOINTED MEMBER TO THE BOARD BY THE^CiHTEF^F/ ^ POLICE. YOU 
STATED YOU WANTED TO WRITE•'-. THE-RESPONSEnr'.^QU-- STATED THAT YOU 
WANTED TO INVESTIGATE - FURTHER INTOi;• THE^HK^Mw^-^^SGT.. RHODES 
STATED TO YOU OUR ONLY REQUIREMENT;"!S T O ^ ^ N I O D S E T F ^ P O L I C Y WAS 
VIOLATED. SGT. RHODES HAS STATED THAT YOU^SVER-TOLD'HIM YOU HAD 
NEW INFORMATION. " A?-?•-.'- -
I DO NOT KNOW WHAT ,THS PERSON WHO WASlSUPPOSED TO HAVE HAD 
PROBLEMS WITH THE DOG HAD TO DO. WITH ..THE. .QUESTS ON;-£E;-.DID OFFICER 
WIN3ERG VIOLATE FIREARMS POLICY'AT THE' ' TIME"ATHEA1-'-DOG"WAS SHOT. 
CONCLUSION YOU WERE AGAIN-LATE FOfcsv,A MEETING..- AND DID NOT 
CARRY OUT YOUR DUTIES IN A" TIMELY MANNER. "YOU" "STATED YOU WERE 
LATE FOR THE MEETING BECAUSE, OF-ATJ^FFIC^liJ^iAJ^EARS: THAT YOU 
SHOULD HAVE LEFT EARLY ENOUGIv~SO THAT ANY^PRPBLEMS:?tHAT:'AROSE YOU 
WOULD STILL BE ON TIMS. SO THAT THREE PEOPLE WOULD 'NOT HAVE TO 
JIT AROUND AND WAIT ON YOU, YOU RECEIVE""^ LETTER OF WRITTEN 
REPRIMAND. -• . .-.-.-•. .v *~j;-t.
 :j-:;-^-•--,•-- .-.-• 
I1EH__4;._ YOU STATED THAT YOU HAD MO INTENTION OF MISSING THE 
TRAIL OF NA7AF.EZ. YOU RECALL TALKING WITH JUDGE SAN3ERG, BUT THAT 
ADDRESS WHY YOU FAILED TO SIGN FOR YOUR SUBPOENA FOR THE NAVAREZ 
TRAIL WHEN YOU WERE REMINDED BY NINA THAT YOU HAD SUBPOENA TO BE 
SIGNED AND ALSO IT WAS NOTED TO YOU ON THE PATROL ROOM THAT YOU 
HAD SUBPOENAS TO 3E SIGNED. IN FACT THE PROCEDURE FOR SUBPOENA'S 
WAS CHANGED BECAUSE YOU DID NOT LIKE THE PROCEDURE THAT WAS BEING 
USED. THE OLD PROCEDURE WAS THE SECRETARY PLACED THE SUBPOENA IN 
YOUR BOX IN THE PATROL ROOM, YOU STATED YOU DID NOT KNOW WHEN YOU 
HAD A SUBPOENA, SO WE CHANGED THE PROCEDURE, THAT YOU HAD TO SIGN 
WITH THE SECRETARY TO RECEIVE YOUR SUBPOENA. EVEN THAT DOESN'T 
SEEM TO WORK FOR YOU AS YOU DON'T SIGN FOR THEM WHEN YOU ARE 
TOLD, AND POSTED THAT YOU HAVE SUBPOENAS. AS FAR AS THE OTHER 
DATES I WAS NOT AWARE OF THESE UNTIL I RECEIVED THE LETTER FROM 
THE JUDGE, FOR MISSING COURT ON AUGUST 8TH. A LETTER OF WRITTEN 
REPRIMAND. 
ITKM 5: YOU STATE THAT YOU DID NOT"""TURN ~IN"~GAS "" SLIPS FOR 
JULY, BECAUSE YOU LOST THEM. ( FIRST.PART OF THE MONTH) YOU STILL 
HAVE NOT TURNED IN WHAT YOU HAVE. I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW YOU 
CAN LOSE GAS SLIPS WHEN YOU COULD TURN THEM IN WITH YOUR LOG. NO 
ONE ELSE LOSES A WHOLE MONTH OF GAS SLIPS. YOU HAVE MADE NO 
EFFORT TO TURN IN YOUR GAS SLIPS THAT YOU HAVE FOR JULY. LETTER 
OF WRITTEN REPRIMAND. 
ITEM B: YOU STATED YOU MISSED THE TIME-YOU- WERE-SUPPOSED TO 
SHOOT BECAUSE YOU OVER SLEPT AND IT WAS YOUR DAY OFF. I HAD 
CHRIS CALL YOU TO TELL YOU TO BE AT THE 14.00 HR SHOOT AND YOU 
STATED TO CHRIS I DID NOT'KNOW ABOUT THE SHOOT. 
ITEM 7: YOU STATED THAT YOU HAD PROBLEMS CONTACTING PEOPLE 
IN THIS CASE. THIS CASE TOOK YOU FROM 6-19-91 TO 8-22-91. I 
CANNOT BELIEVE THAT THIS CASE TOOK THIS LONG, AND I DO NOT 
UNDERSTAND WHAT THE CAR BEING STOLEN HAD TO DO WITH THE ACCIDENT 
REPORT. THE REPORT WAS STILL NOT COMPLETE WHEN YOU TURNED IT IN 
AND THE LT. FINISHED IT. IT APPEARS THAT YOU SIMPLY FORGOT A3CUT 
THE REPORT. 
ITEM R: I WILL AGREE WITH YOU ON THIS SITUATION. 
ITEM 9: YOU ADMIT THAT YOU MISSED COURT ON 8-19-91, THIS 
OCCURRED AT THE RIVERDALE COURT, AND I WILL LEAVE THIS UP TO THE 
JUDGE OF RIVERDALE AS TO WHAT ACTION IS TAKEN, BUT THIS REFLECTS 
AS PER THE JUDGE'S LETTER THAT THE CITIZENS ARE NOT BEING 
PROPERLY SERVED. 
TTEM 10: ON 8-13-91 THE FELONY THEFT CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO 
OFFICER GATHERCOLE TO EE FOLLOWED UP. AFTER A BRIEF CONVERSATION 
WITH YOU ABOUT THE CASE AND INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE CASE. 
YOU WERE TOLD TO PLACE THE CHECK BOOK INTO EVIDENCE. AGAIN UN 
AUGUST 19TH. YOU WERE ORDERED TO PLACE THE CHECK BOOK INTO 
EVIDENCE. THIS WAS PER A TELEPHONE CALL FROM YCU TO THE ETC. 
RESIDENCE. 
AS OF THIS DATE NO SUPPLEMENT MAC BEEN RECORDED THAT YOU 
HAVE PLACED THE CHECK BOOK INTO EVIDENCE. YOU RECEIVE A LETTER 
'"•E REPRIMAND 
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JTEM 11: YOU ADMIT THAT YOU TOOK A GUN AS IT WAS POSSIBLY 
STOLEN, SO THIS MEANT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A REPORT MADE ( NO 
REPORT), EVIDENCE TAG PLACED ON GUN ( NO EVIDENCE TAG). YOU 
STATED TO MS THIS GUN WAS NOT EVIDENCE, IT IS. THERE WAS NO 
RECEIPT GIVEN TO MR. AIKENS WHEN YOU TOOK THE GUN. YOU STATED 
THE LOCKER WAS LOCKED WHEN YOU RETURNED TO WRITE A REPORT, YOU 
COULD HAVE WRITTEN A REPORT ON THE RIFLE AND PUT AN EVIDENCE TAG 
AT THE NEXT DAY POSSIBLE WHEN YOU COULD HAVE CONTACTED MARCIA. 
YOU STATED YOU DID NOT HAVE A RECEIPT BOOK WITH YOU, HAVE YOU 
EVER THOUGHT TO MAKE ONE OUT ON A BLANK PIECE OF PAPER? 
THE LT. TOLD YOU TO TAKE THE GUN BACK TO MR. AIKENS, YOU 
TOLD ME THAT YOU PLACED THE GUN BY A FILE CABINET IN MARCIA'S 
OFFICE BECAUSE YOU WERE TIRED OF HEARING THE LT. BITCH AT YOU. 
IN READING YOUR REPLY AND WHAT MR. AIKENS STATED THERE IS 
CONFLICTING STATEMENTS. 
I FEEL THAT THIS IS GROSS NEGLIGENCE ON THE HANDLING OF 
EVIDENCE, AND THEREFORE YOU WILL RECEIVE A WRITTEN LETTER OF 
REPRIMAND AND THREE DAYS OFF WITHOUT PAY. 
TTKM 1?r I WILL ACCEPT YOUR ANSWER. 
TTEM 13r YOU ADMIT YOUR WERE LATE FOR WORK 42 MINUTES. 
LETTER OF WRITTEN REPRIMAND AND 3 DAYS OFF WITH PAY. 
CONCLUSION: MIKE THERE SEEMS TO BE A QUESTION OF YOUR 
ABILITY TO REMAIN AN EMPLOYEE OF THE WASHINGTON - TERRACE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT. IT IS MY INTENTION THAT YOU BE DISMISSED FROM 
EMPLOYMENT. -
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE THIS APPEALED TO THE D.H.B. 
BOARD, I WILL EXPECT A NAME FROM YOU WITHIN 5 DAYS OR 9-9-91 AS 
PER POLICE DEPARTMENT RULES AND REGULATIONS, PAGE 11 PERSONAL 
DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES SECTION (3) SUB. SECTION (3). THE POLICY 
STATES THE NAME OF A MEMBER OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, YOU MAY 
NAME SOMEONE FROM ANOTHER POLICE DEPARTMENT IF YOU WISH. 
I CANNOT USE OFFICER SATTERTHWAITE TO RUN • THIS BOARD AS HE 
WILL BE CALLED TO TESTIFY SO I AM NAMING THE CITY ADMINISTRATOR 
AS MY CHOICE. IF YOU HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THIS LET ME KNOW. 
GARY W. TRACY. CHIEF OF POLICE 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL D. DARBY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON TERRACE CITY, 
a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
PATTERSON & BARKING 
Philip C. Patterson - 2540 
Attorney for Appellant 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Telephone: (801) 394-7704 
Case No: 930701-CA 
Priority No. 15 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Lee C. Henning - 4593 
David C. Richards - 6023 
Attorneys for Appellee 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 3 55-34 31 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
PAMPHLET OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
1 
Appellee, Washington Terrace City, by and through counsel 
of record, and pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, submits the following pamphlet of statutes 
relied upon by Appellee in its brief. Those statutes include: 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1001: Subordinates in police, health, and 
fire departments to be appointed 
from list. 
The head of each of the police and fire 
departments of cities of the first and second 
class and the health officer in cities of the 
first class shall, by and with the advice and 
consent of the board of city commissioners, 
and subject o the rules and regulations of the 
civil service commission, appoint from the 
classified civil service list furnished by the 
civil service commission all subordinate 
officers, employees, members or agents in his 
department, and in like manner fill all 
vacancies in the same. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-301: Classification of municipalities 
according to population. 
The municipalities referred to in this act 
now existing or hereafter organized shall be 
divided into cities of the first class cities 
of the second class, cities of the third class 
and towns. Those municipalities having 
100,000 or more inhabitants shall be cities of 
the first class, and those municipalities 
having 60,000 or more inhabitants and less 
than 100,000 shall be cities of the second 
class, those municipalities having 800 or more 
inhabitants but less than 60,000 shall be 
cities of the third class and all 
municipalities having less than 800 
inhabitants shall be towns; but this section 
shall not lower the class of any municipality 
which now exists. 
Utah Code Ann. 10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees— 
Duration and termination of term of 
office. 
All appointive officers and employees of 
2 
municipalities, other than members of the 
police departments, fire departments, heads of 
departments, and superintendents, shall hold 
their employment without limitation of time, 
being subject to discharge or dismissal only 
as hereinafter provided. 
Utah Code Ann. § 20-3-918. Chief of police or marshal in third 
class cities and towns. 
In cities of the third class and towns, the 
chief of police or marshal shall exercise and 
perform such duties as may be prescribed by 
the governing body. The chief of police or 
marshal shall be under the direction, control 
and supervision of the mayor. The chief of 
police or marshal may with the consent of the 
mayor, appoint assistants to the chief of 
police or marshal. 
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